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Introduction:
Words on Paper

In August of 1975 the leaders of 35 states gathered in Helsinki, Finland to
sign the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE). They had little idea what consequences the words on the paper could
bring, and many of them probably would not have signed if they had known. The
agreement and the review process it established contained new opportunities to
transcend boundaries and advocate for changes in governance. The Final Act,
which formally acknowledged the borders and regimes of Eastern Europe, spelled
out principles upon which European governance would be based including
peaceful relations among states, as well as respect for human rights and openness
in human contact and information transfer. The CSCE, thanks to the efforts of
dissidents and diplomats, would become a primary means through which human
rights values would shape the Cold War confrontation and the eventual
reconciliation between the Soviet Union and the West.
The Helsinki Final Act was a lengthy agreement establishing norms of
international relations in Europe. It was signed on August 1, 1975 by thirty-three
European countries, including the entire Warsaw Pact, and by the United States
and Canada. The final version of the Act contained five sections. The three major
sections were “Questions Relating to Security in Europe;” “Co-operation in the
Field of Economics, of Science and Technology and of the Environment;” and
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“Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other Fields.” They were respectively
referred to as Basket I, Basket II, and Basket III during the negotiation and
drafting process. Basket I included a set of ten principles that would govern
relations between states. The Final Act also contained a brief section entitled
Questions Relating to Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean, and a
section regarding the Follow-up to the Conference.1
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe saw years of
debating, revising, and compromising by the Soviet bloc and the West before the
Final Act was signed in Helsinki on August 1, 1975. While the CSCE process
included a lot of tedious diplomatic wrangling that could seem at first glance to be
of doubtful value, the diplomatic contest established a shift in the Cold War
rivalry with far-reaching consequences. Initially, Soviet General Secretary Leonid
Brezhnev led the effort to take the diplomatic initiative for Soviet socialism by
promoting a congress of European states. Their ideological challenge was met
primarily by West European delegations who insisted that humanitarian issues
were relevant to security and cooperation. By signing the Final Act, the Soviet
bloc formally accepted that human rights and the free movement of people and
information were to be among the foundations of European order, and the
Western signatories, including all NATO countries, officially recognized the
borders of Soviet-dominated regimes of Eastern Europe. The Soviet delegates
understood that the human rights principles were directed against their system of
1

“Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Final Act,” August 1, 1975. Reproduced
from an official text provided by the US Department of State in International Legal Materials,
Vol. 14, No. 5, September 1975, American Society of International Law, 1292-1325.
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rule, but begrudgingly accepted them in order to achieve the important symbolic
victory of official recognition for Second World War conquests, to strengthen the
Communist position in the diplomatic struggle over divided Germany, and to
enhance their international prestige, which had suffered from the crushing of
Czechoslovak reform and the rise of dissidents.
After 1975, transnational activists and Western governments used the
Final Act and the CSCE Follow-Up Conferences to challenge the Soviet Union’s
human rights practices. Soon after the signing of the act a grassroots struggle to
implement Helsinki human rights norms was taken up by an emerging dissident
movement in the Soviet Union. While the Soviet government soon suppressed
Helsinki activists in the USSR, the activists were still able to influence opinion
about the country and would emerge in the less repressive Gorbachev era with a
platform for change. The United States led vigorous challenges to the Eastern
bloc in the CSCE, decrying the failures of the Soviet Union and its closest allies
to live up to the Final Act’s human rights agreements during follow-up
conferences. While Helsinki activism also took place in some of the Soviet
satellite countries, most prominently by Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet
Union was the dominant member of the Warsaw Pact and the primary actor in
negotiations with the West. Thus, a focus on the Soviet Union is warranted.
For dissidents in the Soviet bloc, Helsinki activism had the advantage of a
unifying platform that Communist governments had signed their support for (the
Final Act), increased international support (the transnational network and the
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international spotlight of the CSCE process), and the inclusion of both powerful
players with political and economic leverage as well as activists planting Helsinki
principles into international norms. Dissidents recognized that the CSCE process
had potential for encouraging change in the Soviet Union. Dissidents had already
been using international contacts and the terminology of human rights, and the
CSCE inspired further development of transnational networks and international
accountability processes. Recognizing the importance the Soviet leadership
placed on the CSCE, dissidents would advocate for the use of the CSCE process
as leverage to encourage reform even before the signing of the Final Act, and
soon afterwards used the Act as a basis for human rights principles and used the
international attention of the CSCE to broadcast Soviet failures to live up to these
principles.
The efforts of government and non-government actors established human
rights norms as an important part of international diplomacy. The US
Congressional Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe established
human rights compliance within CSCE as an official concern of the US
government. The Carter administration and its approach to the CSCE bolstered
this commitment and established human rights as a primary topic in CSCE
follow-up meetings with the help of West European delegations. A series of
transnational activist groups, including Helsinki Watch in the United States,
helped highlight abuses and maintain public pressure on governments. Helsinki
groups operated within the Cold War environment, but as independent actors open
to citizen participation they managed to assert human rights as a continuing
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transnational societal concern and not merely a political weapon of East-West
confrontation.
The Final Act’s concept of human rights became a major component in the
ideological aspect of the East-West confrontation and eventual reconciliation.
Perceptions of human rights and violations of human rights were colored by
ideology, whether Soviet or Western. Soviet leaders viewed their country as
guaranteeing important rights including work and housing, and maintained that
troublemakers and Western imperialists only used “so-called ‘human rights’” as a
cover for dangerous subversive activity. Western leaders saw the human rights
abuses of the Soviet Union and its allies as proof that Communists disregarded
freedom, and tended to overlook abuses by Western allies or non-aligned states in
the CSCE. When the Soviet Union’s human rights policies began to conform
more to the standards set in the CSCE, upholding human rights became a more
cooperative than confrontational endeavor. Trust between the USSR and the West
then increased as ideological conflict decreased.
The CSCE played a major role in working out the principles upon which a
united Europe would rest. The principles served as conditions which the Eastern
Bloc would need to strive for in order to be truly integrated into Europe.
Fulfillment of the agreement also served to measure the trustworthiness of the
Soviet Union. While the CSCE process and the Helsinki Final Act did not launch
Soviet dissent nor serve as the sole source of pressure on the Soviet Union for
human rights improvement, it was one of the most influential diplomatic
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processes owing to the importance that Soviet leaders, Western governments, and
Soviet dissidents placed on it.

The influence of the CSCE on the Soviet Union is best assessed with an
understanding of literature in both Cold War history and Soviet history genres.
This essay attempts to integrate diplomatic history with Soviet political history to
understand Soviet policy regarding the CSCE and human rights from the launch
of the Conference to the new political situation at the end of 1989. It contributes
to understanding how the CSCE process fit into the Cold War and Soviet politics,
but does not attempt to list all pressures and influences on the Soviet Union or
compare their relative weight. It is clear, however, that the effect of the CSCE
must be taken into account to gain a full picture of the end of the Cold War and
Soviet reforms of the late 1980s. Although it is difficult to assess the influence of
numerous factors on Soviet decision-making, Soviet documents, diplomatic
correspondence, and memoirs shed light on the concerns and values of the Soviet
leadership.
When histories of the Cold War discuss the Final Act, it tends to be
examined within the broader context of détente and human rights. Vladislav M.
Zubok, in his book A Failed Empire, discusses the Final Act in the context of
superpower confrontation and Soviet leaders being cautious not to disrupt détente
with embarrassing cases of repression. Zubok stresses that Soviet General
Secretary Leonid Brezhnev wanted to be remembered as a peacemaker. The
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Soviets agreed to the Third Basket in exchange for Western acceptance of the
territorial and political status quo. Although the Final Act initially outraged
ideological conservatives in the Politburo, they were calmed by Foreign Minister
Andrei Gromyko’s insistence that the Soviets got what they wanted and that as far
as human rights were concerned, “we remain the masters in our own house.”
While Zubok writes that “the commitments to human rights embedded in the act
proved to be a time bomb under the Soviet regime,” his later chapters give do not
discuss the CSCE, and focus instead on the initiative of Mikhail Gorbachev and
his enlightened aides, the growing appeal of the West, and the Gorbachev-Reagan
relationship. Imperial overreach, economic trouble, and the Chernobyl disaster
serve as additional motivations for reform. However, human rights, along with
withdrawal from Afghanistan, remained important criteria for Reagan’s
assessment of Soviet intentions.2
Melvyn P. Leffler also presents Brezhnev as an aspiring peacemaker. With
World War II shaping his life experience, Brezhnev “wanted peace and stability
in Europe,” which required the formal recognition of East Germany and the
acceptance of the Oder-Neisse border between East Germany and Poland.
Brezhnev accepted the tradeoff of human rights in return for the recognition of the
territorial status quo. Particularly with the promises of Nixon and Kissinger to not
interfere in the internal affairs of other nations, Brezhnev believed the West had

2

Vladislav M. Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War From Stalin to
Gorbachev (North Carolina, 2009), 231, 237-238.
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been rebuffed and the Final Act’s human rights commitments did not seriously
threaten Communist rule.3
Major works discussing the CSCE and human rights include books by
Sarah Snyder, Daniel Thomas, and Alexis Heraclides, as well as an essay by
Svetlana Savranskaya. In The Helsinki Effect, Thomas chronicles the development
of human rights norms in international diplomacy and how this affected activism
in the Soviet bloc. Believing that the norms established by the CSCE would
ultimately have little effect, Soviet leaders agreed to their inclusion in return for
recognition of post-war borders. The CSCE established a process of
“transnational socialization” through domestic and international demands for
compliance with human rights norms, which set in motion revolutionary changes
resulting in the end of communist rule in 1989-1990.4 While Thomas is careful to
note that Helsinki and human rights activism is not a mono-causal explanation for
transitions in the Soviet bloc, his reliance on discussions with Helsinki activists
and his presentation of dissidence prior to 1975 suggests that he might be
overemphasizing the Helsinki effect. In Human Rights Activism and the End of
the Cold War, Sarah B. Snyder effectively shows how advocacy by transnational
activists and their communication with activists in the Soviet bloc put Helsinki
principles into effect. However, her focus on the human rights issue does not give
a clear picture of where human rights fit into the Cold War confrontation and her

3

Melvyn P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, The Soviet Union, and the Cold
War (New York, 2007), 241, 249.
4
Daniel C. Thomas, The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of
Communism. (Princeton, 2001), 35, 61, 284-287.

11

emphasis on human rights without enough contextual caveats or examination of
Soviet internal politics implies an overly-prominent place for the Helsinki process
in the Cold War.5 Security and Cooperation in Europe: The Human Dimension,
by Alexis Heraclides, contributes thorough detail on humanitarian issues within
the diplomatic process of the CSCE. Another valuable source is Svetlana
Savranskaya’s essay “Human Rights Movement in the USSR After the Signing of
the Helsinki Final Act, and the Reaction of Soviet Authorities.” While
Savranskaya’s essay is short, it provides helpful details on how Soviet dissidents
were affected by the Final Act and how the KGB reacted. In addition, articles by
Angela Romano and Michael Cotey Morgan describe how the Soviets aimed at
seeking greater international legitimacy and increasing stability in Europe.6
Valuable works in the field of Soviet history that discuss Soviet reform
include Armageddon Averted by Stephen Kotkin and The Gorbachev Factor by
Archie Brown. Kotkin focuses mostly on Soviet economic and structural
problems and Gorbachev’s belief in a better Communism. However, he does
include the CSCE among the Western pressures on the Soviet Union. The Final
Act “led to an international legal and moral ‘full court press’ that Soviet
diplomats and negotiators felt alongside Western military, economic, and political

5

Sarah B. Snyder, Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: A Transnational History
of the Helsinki Network (Cambridge, 2011).
6
Angela Romano, “The Main Task of the European Political Cooperation: Fostering Détente in
Europe” in Poul Villaume and Odd Arne Westad, eds, Perforating the Iron Curtain: European
Détente, Transatlantic Relations, and the Cold War, 1965-1985 (Copenhagen, 2010);
Michael Cotey Morgan, “The United States and the Making of the Helsinki Final Act,” in
Frederick Longevall and Andrew Preston, eds., Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations,
1969-1977, (Oxford, 2008), 164-182.
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might.”7 The Gorbachev Factor focuses on Gorbachev’s critical influence, and
discusses his background, beliefs, appointments, and shifts in policy. While it
does not discuss the CSCE, it does highlight Gorbachev’s affinity for the West.8
The CSCE process, which included the work of activists in the Soviet bloc
and their advocates in the West, was one important factor driving reform in the
Soviet Union and the dissolution of Cold War divisions in Europe. It started as a
Soviet diplomatic initiative to assert the leadership of Soviet socialism. Soon
West Europeans fought to include humanitarian standards in the principles of
European order. Then Soviet dissidents would convince the West to take up the
human rights struggle, which was most vigorously pursued by the United States.
Finally, the Soviet Union adopted Helsinki human rights principles, helping to
dissolve Cold War tensions while driving the country toward democracy.

7
8

Stephen Kotkin, Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse 1970-2000, (Oxford, 2001), 24.
Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, (New York, 1997).
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Chapter 1:
Brezhnev and Europe, 1968-1975

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe originated in
Soviet efforts to advance their interests while avoiding a major war. Through the
drafting of the principles upon which stability in Europe was to lie, the CSCE
became a forum to contest the meaning of European order. Despite misgivings,
Soviet officials approved of signing the Final Act with the human rights principles
that West Europeans insisted on including. They went ahead with the Final Act
primarily because they believed it would boost their international prestige, which
Brezhnev tied to his personal image as a statesman. An official World War II
settlement was a huge political success when Soviet identity was tied firmly to the
victory against fascism. Fears of West German revanchist politics contributed to
the Soviets’ sense of urgency. The CSCE was part of sincere efforts to normalize
relations with the West, but Soviet leaders wanted to have peace on their terms
and establish better conditions for expanding Soviet ideological hegemony. The
Soviet ideological offensive involved recovering prestige they had lost by
crushing reform in Czechoslovakia and recovering the regime’s attraction after
the emergence of dissidents. Their ideological challenge was met by the West,
primarily West Europeans. The Final Act was the result of intense diplomatic
struggle. Its effects on Soviet politics and the Cold War were rooted in the
struggles surrounding its creation.
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Participants in the CSCE process, as well as historians, have recognized
that the Soviets reluctantly accepted the human rights principles and the
requirements for open communication and travel in return for recognition of their
dominance in Eastern Europe. In a 1974 memorandum, a US official recognized
that the European delegates were “reluctant to consider further compromise” until
the Soviets continued negotiations on matters of “human contacts.” The Soviet
delegation was less than enthusiastic.9 Eventually the Soviets would agree to the
inclusion of the Basket III principles regarding free movement of people and
access to information. They would also assent to “Respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or
belief” being recognized as one of the ten principles guiding relations among
states listed in Basket I.
While some of the questions that need to be addressed in answering why
the Soviet Union accepted human rights principles in the CSCE are discussed in
the historiography, questions remain about why the Soviets put so much
importance on official Western recognition of the postwar status quo. The
historiography shows that the Soviets viewed the human rights principles as a
threat that they could deal with. However, it is less clear why the Soviet
leadership attached so much importance to the recognition of its gains in Eastern
Europe. By the early 1970s the West was not seriously challenging the status quo
that had existed in Eastern Europe for over two decades. Soviet hegemony was
9

Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hartman) to Secretary
of State Kissinger, June 30, 1974, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1969-1976, Vol.
39, Doc 227.
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confirmed as recently as their 1968 military invasion of Czechoslovakia to ensure
the monopoly of Communist Party rule. In addition, bilateral agreements were
being made at the time between Western and Eastern bloc countries. The Soviet
approach to the CSCE was based on how they viewed their gains and losses, how
they understood the territorial recognition gained in the Final Act and how they
assessed the degree to which Western proposals threatened their rule.
To Soviet officials, official recognition for their World War II gains was
an important victory. It meant international recognition for the immense sacrifice
and glorious victory against fascism by the forces of liberation led by the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. As Brezhnev remarked in a speech
commemorating the thirtieth anniversary of the victory against Germany, “in the
course of the 20th century, our country has twice stood at the source of major
changes in the face of the world,” the first being the October Revolution that
installed Bolshevik rule, and the second being “the rout of fascism, in which the
Soviet Union played the decisive role.”10 In a 1972 speech commemorating the
fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of the USSR, Brezhnev plainly connected
the war to the European security conference. He proclaimed that the Soviet people
remembered the two world wars “burst into their homes from the West, from
Europe.” They would remember 1941 and the twenty million Soviet people killed

10

Lenoid Brezhnev, “A Great Exploit of the Soviet People,” May 8, 1975, Following Lenin’s
Course: Speeches and Articles (Moscow, 1975), 551.
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during the war “as we complete the historic work of guaranteeing the
immutability of the postwar European settlement.”11
The importance of the war was not limited to the statements of politicians.
Stephen Kotkin writes that Victory Day, commemorating the end of the war, “was
a powerful collective ritual, involving family trips to the cemetery, whose
meaning was shared by almost the entire country.” It also “underscored the
attainment of superpower status.”12 Eduard Shevardnadze, who would eventually
become Foreign Minister under Gorbachev, remarked that “The war shaped me as
it did millions of my contemporaries. It formed my convictions and purpose in
life.”13 World War II remained a powerful rallying banner for the Soviet Union in
the 1970s. The importance of the war experience to the Soviets was understood at
the time by Western political leaders. In a December 1974 conversation between
French and American officials, Henry Kissinger noted that Brezhnev wanted the
final conference to be held “before the anniversary of the Second World War,”
which did not happen because the Western allies delayed the conference. French
President Valery Giscard d’Estang acknowledged that “They think this is the final
price of the war, and that is why they want it before May. It is for [Brezhnev] the
last price of détente also.”14

11

Brezhnev, “The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,” December 21,
1972, Following Lenin’s Course, 89.
12
Kotkin, Armageddon Averted, 45.
13
Shevardnadze was born in 1928. Eduard Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom (New
York, 1991), 13.
14
Memorandum of Conversation, December 15, 1974, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 39, Doc 267.
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Brezhnev’s personal ambitions influenced the CSCE process. The
Conference would be his crowning achievement as a great Soviet statesmen and
peacemaker. By gaining ratification of the World War II settlement, Brezhnev
showed that he could do what Stalin and Khrushchev had failed to accomplish.15
The signing of the Final Act was initially seen by Brezhnev as the consummation
of decades of Soviet diplomacy and the peak of Soviet international influence.16
Daniel Thomas notes that as negotiations dragged on, Brezhnev became
“increasingly anxious to claim victory in the CSCE in time for the Twenty-fifth
Communist Party Congress,” scheduled for February 1976, where he would
proclaim the successes of his leadership to Communist Party officials.17 The
Helsinki Final Act would provide official recognition of Soviet gains in the
Second World War. Brezhnev had attained a grand agreement of peace which,
importantly, he viewed as being settled on Soviet terms.
It was only after a hard political struggle that Brezhnev reached the top
position in the USSR, which enabled him to institute his détente program, and he
hoped that his achievements in foreign affairs would provide a substantial portion
of the clout he needed to stay on top. Vladislav Zubok characterizes Brezhnev as
“a centrist politician and an enemy of radical political moves in any direction.”
When Nikita Khrushchev was ousted in 1964, Brezhnev was only one member of

15

Carole Fink, “Facing Leonid Brezhnev and Each Other During the High Era of Détente: Nixon,
Brandt, and Meir, 1969-1974.” (lecture, Columbia Seminar on Twentieth-Century Politics and
Society, New York, November 16, 2011).
16
Svetlana Savranskaya, “Human Rights Movement in the USSR After the Signing of the
Helsinki Final Act, and the Reaction of Soviet Authorities,” in Leopoldo Nuti, ed, The Crisis of
Détente in Europe: From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975-1985 (New York, 2009), 37.
17
Thomas, The Helsinki Effect, 81.
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the cabal that succeeded him, and by no means the most prominent. Alexei
Kosygin appeared to be the top statesman and took a leading role in foreign
affairs. However, Brezhnev, despite his limited education and earlier lack of
ability to inspire confidence as a leader, began to rise. From 1967 to 1968 he
consolidated his party constituency and removed many rivals from positions of
authority. Brezhnev understood that he could not compete with Kosygin in the
area of domestic economy, but would be able to outshine Kosygin in foreign
affairs. Although Brezhnev’s military reforms oversaw drastic increases in
nuclear armaments, in foreign policy he came to rely not on dogmatic
conservatives but on a few policy experts, particularly Foreign Minister Andrei
Gromyko. Gromyko admired Stalin’s diplomacy during the Grand Alliance years
and tried to avoid the overuse of ideology in foreign affairs. His primary goal was
to obtain Western recognition of the new borders of the USSR and Soviet
satellites in Central Europe.18 Détente was a personal project of Brezhnev and his
advisors, who needed to defend their policies and their positions from hard-line
rivals.
Brezhnev’s response to Czechoslovakia’s 1968 reforms was his first major
test of leadership, and it would have profound effects on the USSR’s international
position and legitimacy. His order to send Warsaw Pact forces to Czechoslovakia
in August 1968 confirmed the monopoly of Communist Party power within the
18

Major territorial changes included the annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which
became Soviet republics, the shifting of Poland’s borders westward into pre-war Germany, and the
shifting of the Soviet border westward into the former territories of several states. The USSR also
saw itself as defending the sovereign German Democratic Republic (East Germany) from Western
revanchists and Nazi sympathizers. Zubok, A Failed Empire, 194-195, 201, 204-206.
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Soviet sphere of interest, but also undermined international perceptions of Soviet
legitimacy. A Communist government had been established in Czechoslovakia in
the immediate postwar period and the country was a member of the Warsaw Pact.
In early 1968, the country’s Communist leadership under Alexander Dubcek
began a set of reforms that came to be known as the Prague Spring. They relaxed
restrictions on cultural expression and on the freedom of association, and the
government even took steps to end the political monopoly of the Communist
Party.19
Dubcek’s reforms shook up the entire Warsaw Pact. Brezhnev, who had
supported the appointment of Dubcek, was personally at risk of losing his power.
For example, the Ukrainian first secretary blamed the Prague Spring on
Brezhnev’s “rotten liberalism” while the leaders of Poland and East Germany
pushed for military intervention in Czechoslovakia and openly criticized
Brezhnev as too emotional, naïve, and non-committal. Supporters and opponents
of intervention shouted at each other in the party headquarters in Moscow.
Brezhnev agonized over how to respond. He started taking tranquilizers, a habit
that he would never overcome. After KGB chair Yuri Andropov falsely depicted
the Czechs as preparing for an armed uprising and Foreign Minister Andrei
Gromyko gave assurance that the West would not intervene, Brezhnev approved
the invasion.20 On August 20, in the largest Soviet military movement since
World War II, Soviet troops, along with tens of thousands of troops from Poland,

19
20

Thomas, The Helsinki Effect, 34.
Zubok, A Failed Empire, 207-208; Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind, 239.
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Hungary, East Germany, and Bulgaria, entered Czechoslovakia. Soldiers seized
key buildings and Soviet authorities removed reformers from power as tanks
entered the streets to assert control. Initially Dubcek was pressured to lead an antireformist government, but he would be forced to step down in April to make room
for Gustav Husak, a Slovak party leader the Soviets had come to look favorably
upon as a reliable hardliner. By mid-1970 the Husak government expelled Dubcek
from the Party and instituted a series of purges instituted.21
The suppression of the Prague Spring dealt a severe blow to the appeal of
Soviet socialism, which had crushed “socialism with a human face.” Many
members of Communist parties in the West began to turn away from the Soviet
Union, and the Communist parties of Italy and Spain openly condemned the
Soviet invasion.22 China denounced the invasion and reinforced its troops at the
Soviet border. Albania severed its last ties with the USSR. Even Romania, a
Warsaw Pact member, ridiculed the invasion.23 Within the Soviet Union there was
also cause for concern. The KGB warned that the majority of undergraduates at
Soviet universities were impressed by the Czech students. “What has attracted
especially great interest is the creation of opposition parties. The very word
‘opposition’ is something students find appealing,” concluded KGB director Yuri
Andropov.24 Dissident and physicist Yuri Orlov recalled that in 1968 he “did not
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encounter a single individual among my enormous number of acquaintances who
was not excited” by the Czech’s idea of transforming Soviet-style socialism into
socialism with a human face. However, in Russia “ordinary people cursed the
ungrateful Czechs for forgetting that the Soviet army had saved them from the
Nazis.”25
Although Soviet leaders worried less about intellectual currents within in
the USSR as they did about those in Czechoslovakia, the late 1960s also saw an
increase in dissent in the USSR. The dissident movement that emerged in the mid
1960s became prominent in 1968 when the samizdat journal Chronicle of Current
Events appeared, the first issue of which featured the UN Declaration of Human
Rights.26 In the same year, Andrei Sakharov, who had received the Hero of
Socialist Labor award for his leading work on the hydrogen bomb, first came into
serious conflict with the regime after the underground publishing of his essay
“Reflections on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom,” which
was subsequently reprinted worldwide.27 In addition, rising Jewish and Zionist
consciousness, bolstered by Israel’s decisive victory in the Six Day War of 1967,
inspired a number of Soviet Jews to oppose the regime that typically regarded
them as bottom-rung citizens.28 Many of them would become known as
“refuseniks” after the Soviet Union refused them permission to emigrate, and a
25

Yuri Orlov, Dangerous Thoughts: Memoirs of a Russian Life (New York, 1991), 152.
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few would later become prominent members of human rights groups. Many
Soviet dissidents, who saw the Prague Spring reflecting their advocacy for a more
humane socialism against Brezhnev’s Stalinist direction in domestic policy, cried
out against the invasion of Czechoslovakia.29
From Brezhnev’s viewpoint in the early 1970s, taking the initiative in
convening a European security conference could help the Soviets recover their
prestige and following as the self-proclaimed leaders of the international working
class in the climate of dissent and disillusionment of 1968. Indeed, taking a
leading role in the establishment of peace and security in Europe would allow him
to present Soviet power in a positive light. Moreover, bringing the Warsaw Pact
regimes to a conference of European states was a way to legitimize them as
socialist partners, and their participation in a conference with Western states made
them appear as more legitimate members of the international community. Leaders
of Warsaw Pact countries often did have their own interests in mind at the CSCE,
including the desire to reduce their economic dependence on Moscow, but they
generally aligned their CSCE policy with that of the Soviet Union.30
Paradoxically, Brezhnev’s success in Czechoslovakia allowed him more freedom
to pursue his personal goals of détente because it strengthened his control of the
party leadership. On March 17, 1969, the Warsaw Pact issued a renewed call for a
European security conference. The Soviets had previously proposed a European
security conference as early as 1954, but their 1969 pronouncement was the first
29

Kusin, From Dubcek to Charter 77, 36.
Thomas, The Helsinki Effect, 35; Snyder, Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War,
26.
30

23

time they invited the US as a participant and did not demand the dissolution of
NATO.31
To the Kremlin, CSCE efforts were part of a strategy for making gains in
the Cold War political contest through peaceful means. It is certainly not giving
Brezhnev too much credit to acknowledge that the experience of the Second
World War impacted him and the thought of nuclear war horrified him, but to
Brezhnev and many other Soviet leaders the efficacy of peace was tied to Soviet
power. They saw themselves as pursuing an active policy of peace, with Soviet
arms providing a check on Western aggression.32 Détente rested on the
acknowledgement that relaxation of tensions did not mean agreement. As
Shevardnadze put it, Soviet old thinking regarded “peaceful co-existence as a
specific form of class warfare.”33 Brezhnev explicitly stated this in his 1972
speech commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the USSR. He announced that
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had always assumed and would
continue to assume that the “class struggle” between the capitalist and socialist
systems in the economic, political, and ideological domains would continue
because “the world outlook and the class aims of socialism and capitalism are
opposite and irreconcilable.” However, the Soviet Union would “strive to shift
this historically inevitable struggle onto a path free from the perils of war, of
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dangerous conflicts, and an uncontrolled arms race.”34 Soviet leaders sought to
advance their international position in ways they believed would be unlikely to
cause war between the superpowers. To this end, they hoped the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe would establish a framework for the
advancement of socialism by peaceful means, and would itself be a forum for
diplomatic struggle between East and West.
Though the advancement of the Communist position was one purpose for
the CSCE, the Soviets saw Western recognition of the legitimacy of Communist
governments as a crucial step in normalizing relations between East and West.
Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin discussed concerns
over the Nixon administration’s view of Eastern borders and frontiers with
Kissinger in early 1970. Kissinger assured Dobrynin that President Nixon viewed
existing borders as “immutable” but would not publically state this position
regarding the German division.35 While earlier European security conference
proposals by the Communist bloc had sought to isolate the United States by
keeping them out of the conference, by the 1970s the Soviets actively pressed the
United States to get involved. Unlike political leaders in Western Europe, Nixon
and Kissinger were not interested in the conference that they saw little to gain
from, and they did little to bring it to fruition. After repeated pleas from the Soviet
government, Kissinger began taking a more active role, but continued to deride
the conference. In a 1974 discussion with diplomats from the Netherlands, he
34
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declared that “We don’t care about CSCE. We were against the conference in the
first place.” He only cared that the conference did “not do any damage.”36 To the
Soviets, the CSCE would play a major role in the normalization of foreign
relations and the relaxation of tensions between them and the Western capitalist
countries.
While the Eastern bloc did have economic motivations for pursuing and
agreeing to the Final Act, economic motivations appear to be less important than
political concerns. Economic benefits should not be considered a tradeoff because
the Western Europeans also desired more economic exchange, and economic
planks were not subject to major disputes in the CSCE negotiations. Dobrynin
wrote that by the time of the twenty-fourth party congress in 1971 the party
establishment, facing a stagnant economy, the emergence of dissidents, and the
growth of discontent among the educated classes, began to “realize the need to
satisfy the population’s basic requirements more fully and to narrow the gap with
the West.” Soviet officials would not pursue political or economic liberalization,
but “the realities of the rest of the world and the strains on our economy prompted
the Soviet leadership to improve relations with the nations of Europe and the
United States.”37 They hoped that normalization of relations would benefit the
Communist countries by facilitating economic exchanges. However, the CSCE
did not establish a particular trade regime and trade agreements would differ
36
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among the signatories. Trade arrangements between the Soviet Union and the
United States were restricted by the United States passage of the Jackson-Vanik
amendment, attached to a December 1974 trade bill, which made improved trade
relations with the Soviet Union contingent on the Kremlin’s Jewish emigration
policy.38 However, trade agreements were not subject to major disputes in the
CSCE. Western European governments tended to look favorably upon improved
trade relations with the East and viewed wider economic exchange as one of their
goals for the Conference.39 The Soviets could have improved trade relations in
agreements without the CSCE, but the CSCE streamlined the process. Trade
relations with the United States continued to suffer, but trade with Western
Europe grew, as a result of politics within the Western countries.
As much as they worried about American intentions, the Communist bloc
leaders also worried about West German territorial ambitions and hoped to
diplomatically block them. Throughout the 1960s, the Soviet and East German
governments decried “revanchism” among the West Germans.40 These worries
were not entirely without basis. Chancellor Willy Brandt recalled that when he
met with East German representative Willi Stoph in 1970, “several thousand
Nazis – and others who acted like Nazis – had assembled in a protest
demonstration,” some bearing sings calling for the execution of Brandt. The
crowds attacked the car that the two men were travelling in and youths took down
38
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the East German flag at the hotel where the proceedings were held. These events
were undoubtedly reported to East Berlin and Moscow.41
The Soviet leaders’ concern with West Germany and their view of the
CSCE’s effects on the diplomatic contest is shown by actions they took shortly
after Helsinki. On October 7, 1975, the Soviets signed the Treaty of Friendship,
Mutual Assistance and Cooperation Between the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and the German Democratic Republic. The treaty’s preamble contained
a passage reaffirming the “internationalist duty of the socialist countries” to
uphold, consolidate and defend “socialist gains,” along with promises to
strengthen peace and security in Europe based on mutually beneficial cooperation between states with different social systems. Article eight of the treaty
promised that if one of the parties was subject to armed attack “the other High
Contracting Party will regard this as an attack upon itself and will immediately
render it every assistance.” In effect, a renewed military alliance was signed by
East Germany and the Soviet Union little more than two months after the
concluding peace settlement of the Second World War, a settlement that was
supposed to officially mark the establishment of peaceful cooperation as the basis
of diplomacy in Europe. 42 While the Treaty of Friendship does serve to clarify the
basis of relations between East Germany and the Soviet Union, it makes sense to
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view it as the next step in Communist diplomatic maneuvering in the waging of
international “class struggle” by peaceful means, and partly as a response to the
threat of renewed outside influence.
Articles six and seven of the Treaty of Friendship make it clear that the
Treaty is aimed at West Germany. Article six begins by proclaiming that “The
High Contracting Parties regard the inviolability of the frontiers in Europe as the
paramount requirement for safeguarding European security.” The frontiers
between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany
are mentioned specifically, and the parties promise to “exert joint efforts to
counter any manifestations of revanchism or militarism and will work for strict
compliance with the treaties concluded to strengthen European security.” Article
seven reaffirmed that ties with West Berlin would be based on “the fact that it is
not a constituent part of the Federal Republic of Germany and will continue not to
be governed by it.”43 Essentially, the treaty used the language and principles of
Basket I to attempt to contain West Germany and imply that West Berlin fell
within the inviolable borders of East Germany. This was consistent with the
strategy discussed in a 1970 policy analysis by the GDR Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, which considered it “an essential task” to establish judicial and political
settlements that reduced the “room of maneuver for West German imperialism.”44
The Treaty of Friendship was not only about the Soviet Union reaffirming its
43
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commitment to East Germany, but it was also an attempt to advance the
Communist position by diplomatic means.
The treaty also established a renewed cohesion of the Communist bloc in
the face of increased contact with the West that the Final Act promised. It
underscored the importance of strengthening state ideology against outside
influences. The parties would “concert their efforts to make effective use of the
material and spiritual potential of their peoples and states for the purposes of
building a socialist and communist society and strengthening the socialist
community.” The treaty called for the promotion of “co-operation between their
organs of state power and between their social organizations” and encouraged the
development of contacts between the people of the two countries.45 These clauses
should be seen as responses to the threat of increased openness, an expression of
resisting the “anti-socialist effects intended by the imperialist states” through
“increased coordination and cooperation” in the Eastern bloc.46 They were part of
the Communist efforts to mitigate the potential damage caused by the parts of the
Final Act that were undesirable to the Communist leadership, consistent with the
view that the Western initiatives in the Final Act were threats that Communist
parties were capable of dealing with.
The Western reaction to the Treaty of Friendship was unsurprised and
undeterred. West German Federal Minister Franke stated bluntly that “this treaty
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was to be expected and is consonant with the policies of these two states,” but that
it could not change the current legal situation.47 The governments of France, the
United Kingdom, and the United States issued an official statement one week
later declaring that “no treaty concluded by any of the Four Powers with a third
state can in any way affect the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers,” and
therefore the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers were unaffected by the
Treaty of Friendship.48 A December 1976 policy statement by West German
Chancellor Schmidt on relations between the German states called for continued
improvement in relations while insisting that their Germany policy was “free from
illusions.” Schmidt declared that “Everyone knows that the aim of our policy is to
work for a state of peace in Europe in which the German nation will regain its
unity through free self-determination,” and acknowledged that “the GDR
leadership pursues as its long-term goal the replacement, the defeat, of our
political system.”49 The Western allies would meet the Soviet diplomatic
challenge, and they continued to hold onto West Berlin. It was accepted that the
Final Act established a new, less dangerous setting for each side to pursue their
foreign policy goals, though complaints and accusations would continue.
The Conference thus presented opportunities to generally enhance the
international position and prestige of the Soviet Union in a way that bilateral
47
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agreements and recognitions could not. After the March, 1969 Warsaw Pact call
for a conference, NATO in December endorsed the idea of holding a conference,
and Multilateral Preparatory Talks began on November 22, 1972.50 According to
Brezhnev, the Conference, “for which the socialist countries have worked for
many years, should open a new chapter in European history.”51 The Warsaw Pact
was taking the initiative in foreign affairs and presenting itself as the leading
advocate for international peace. Internationalism was an important element in the
founding mythos of the Soviet Union. In his speeches Brezhnev hailed the
wisdom of Lenin’s vision of the peaceful coexistence of states with different
social systems. He presented the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as the
leader of an international working class movement.
Communist ideology was an important factor in Soviet decision-making as
it formed the context through which Soviet leaders assessed state interests.
Melvyn Leffler noted that “The leaders of the Kremlin were interested primarily
in the power of their state and the survival of their regime, but any account that
trivializes their faith in the superiority of their system or that obfuscates their
conviction that they were engaged in a long-term systemic struggle misses an
important part of their belief system.”52 Soviet leaders’ perception of the threats
their country faced and the advances they made was shaped by their Communist
ideology. By the 1970s Soviet ideology was not only competing against Western
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capitalists and social democrats, but also against Maoism and anti-Soviet
European Communist parties to be the international leader of the working class.
By proposing the conference and then actively pushing for American
involvement, Soviet leaders took the initiative in foreign relations and hoped to
set peace on their terms. They took a step in reestablishing Europe as the primary
theater of East-West confrontation, and hoped that by resolving tensions in
Europe the Soviet Union would become more integrated into European politics. It
was, to use the 1970 phrasing of the GDR, an ideological offensive that would
increase the international magnetism of Soviet communism and exploit divisions
among the capitalist states.53
West European leaders met the challenge of a diplomatic contest with the
Communist bloc by tenaciously arguing that provisions concerning human rights
and the peaceful change of borders must be included in the Act. In addition to
their desire to ease tensions and open up trade opportunities with the East, they
also sought to establish the norms that at least in principle would define European
identity. To members of the European Community, this meant some recognition
of human rights as a basis for legitimacy.54 They also saw greater openness as a
way of establishing a more secure situation in Europe by fostering trust and
understanding between different peoples. The West Germans argued for language
allowing for peaceful change of frontiers in accordance with international law.
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Although at times it may have seemed that the largely cohesive Eastern bloc had
managed to set the Western allies against each other, the various positions held by
West European countries meant that the Soviets would have to deal with
numerous proposals and try to compromise with those least offensive to them.
The West European approach to the conference took the diplomatic initiative
away from the Soviet Union by proposing numerous principles to attach to
peaceful coexistence. The Communist bloc had long proposed a European
conference, and had just renewed their call for a conference, positioning
themselves to the Eastern public and to the world as the leaders in international
peace. For the Soviets to back out later, especially when it would have been clear
they backed out over issues of human rights, free movement, and free exchange of
information, would have been a defeat in the contest for international legitimacy.
The pursuit of competing concepts of European security and cooperation
resulted in lengthy debate and revision interrupted by periods of stalling. The
process was exacerbated by the fact that the Final Act would be issued in multiple
languages, and delegates argued when translations used words that implied
greater or less strictness or specificity. Principle 7, a series of statements on
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, required more sessions than
any of the other principles and took three months to negotiate. Even more difficult
were the Basket III negotiations, which lasted from March 1973 to June 1975.55
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In general, as negotiations wore on, the drafters made language less
specific, such as when they dropped “free movement of ideas” and adopted
“Cooperation in Humanitarian and other fields.”56 The insistence on including
provisions for the peaceful change of frontiers, which was especially of interest to
the West German delegation, was a major stumbling block. Brezhnev wanted the
inviolability of borders to be the principle that stood above everything else, but
the West Germans insisted that inviolability of borders be linked to the possibility
of peaceful change. The placement of this clause in the document and even the
punctuation of the clause became major sticking points.57 The final outcome was
to place the offending sentence within the first principle in the section Questions
Relating to Security in Europe. It read “They consider that their frontiers can be
changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by
agreement.” Inviolability of frontiers was itself enumerated as Principle III.58
Participants in the CSCE process, unlike Kissinger, took the language of the Act
very seriously.
The Soviet leadership used a major conference because the attention it
would garner most effectively achieved their goals of advancing their European
diplomatic position and their international legitimacy while achieving a climactic
conclusion to the Second World War. The spectacle of the conference made the
long-delayed conclusion to the Second World War more climactic than it would
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have been with minor, gradual recognitions, and enhanced the prestige of the
regime for which the War was a defining national moment. Brezhnev “could
easily assess the potential publicity he would gain - above all, in his own country when the Soviet public learned of the final settlement of the postwar boundaries
for which they had sacrificed so much.”59 If the goal was only to make
agreements between national leaders, this could have been achieved through the
continuation of bilateral and multilateral negotiations that were increasing
diplomatic recognition and stability while the Conference was still being put
together.60 Taking a leading role in the CSCE meant the Soviets were taking on a
leading role in Europe and showing to the world their initiative as internationalists
and peacemakers. Brezhnev did not want to hide behind an iron curtain, but
wanted to charm his way onto the world stage as a great statesman leading the
international working class.
What the Communist participants in the CSCE traded for official
recognition and the improvement of their international situation was the formal
acceptance of West European human rights norms and greater openness to
Western influence. They believed that this was a threat that they were wellequipped to deal with. As described above, the Treaty of Friendship contained an
example of tightening the Eastern bloc to better ensure the success of Soviet
socialism. Brezhnev’s speech to the CSCE on the eve of the signing of the Final
Act showed the Soviet perception. It included the obligatory insistence that Lenin,
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whom Brezhnev reminded the audience was the founder of the Soviet state,
“fought with such conviction and consistency” for peaceful coexistence, a cause
“for which our people are fighting to this day.”61 The “main conclusion” the Final
Act presented to the future “is this: no one should try, from foreign policy
considerations of one kind or another, to dictate to other peoples how they should
manage their internal affairs.”62 This conclusion was supported by the United
States. In a March 1975 letter to President Ford, Brezhnev noted his satisfaction
in seeing a letter from Ford “justly state that inviolability of frontiers is the key
element in ensuring security and cooperation in Europe.” Brezhnev hailed this
“clear reaffirmation” by the President of the United States “that the US accepts
without qualification the frontiers and territorial integrity of all European
states.”63 The Soviets held that the Final Act was a matter of securing peaceful
coexistence by recognizing the borders of Eastern Europe, a major step forward in
the campaign for peace initiated by the Communist bloc following Lenin’s course.
Soviet success in achieving peace was supposed to not only safeguard the
revolutions that the Communist party had already brought to fruition, but also to
make Soviet socialism more attractive to the international working class.
The Soviet leadership believed that they could ensure the Final Act would
be perceived as they wanted it to be, at least in their sphere of influence. Gromyko
argued that the recognition of postwar boundaries would be a major political and
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propaganda victory, and the Basket II clauses would open up economic
opportunities. He insisted that implementing the human rights commitments was
up to the Soviet government, which was technically true as the Final Act was not
legally binding. “We are masters in our own house,” he assured the Politburo.
Brezhnev supported Gromyko, believing that the human rights elements of the
Act could be downplayed with the help of the Party’s control of the press.64
Ironically, news media in the United States generally reflected the view that
Brezhnev won in Helsinki, and both the New York Times and the Wall Street
Journal blasted the Ford administration for its acceptance of Soviet hegemony in
Eastern Europe.65 This brings up the interesting speculative question of whether
the Soviets would have agreed to the Final Act had the United States been more
insistent on the issue of human rights. While the US probably could have derailed
the Conference by taking a belligerent posture, it is possible that if the American
delegation took an active, businesslike role like that of the West Europeans they
could have made the CSCE process more effective and acceptable to the
American public. In any case, more stable and open relations prevailed in Europe,
and the Soviet Union accepted in principle that political legitimacy was based on
respecting certain fundamental rights. Soviet leaders did not think this principle
was much of a threat to their power and believed they had come out ahead in a
difficult contest with the West.
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The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was a forum for
the power struggles of international diplomacy. It was not a friendly summit but a
peace settlement between acknowledged rivals where each side tried to secure
peace on the most favorable terms possible. The Soviet goal of advancing their
version of socialism through peaceful struggle was challenged by the Western
European powers and their view of what was required for membership in the
community of Europe. The CSCE showed the potential of détente not as surrender
or mere acceptance of the political status quo, but as the pursuit of the
international rivalry in an atmosphere of relaxing tensions. The CSCE also
provided a venue for Western Europeans to assert what it meant to belong to
Europe, in the face of one superpower and generally without the help of the other.
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was part of an active
process of changing the political situation in Europe by moving away from Cold
War confrontation. Through transnational activism and the follow-up conferences
called for in the Final Act, the CSCE would continue to affect the ideological
contest as relations froze and thawed.
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Chapter 2:
From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975-1985

The Soviet victory did not last long. The Soviet Union failed to establish
its concept of the Helsinki Final Act at home or abroad. In fact, European détente
“prompted and accelerated a set of challenges ‘from below’ that transformed the
East-West relationship.”66 Dissident activity in the Soviet Union increased and
greater transnational contact between activists, reporters, and government officials
increased pressure on the USSR. While repression and propaganda isolated the
dissident movement, Soviet leaders were unable to present a positive program
against the human rights ideals championed by the West and resorted to obstinacy
in international relations by stonewalling in discussions of human rights and
behaving defensively. With the Soviet Union on the defensive, CSCE Follow-Up
Meetings provided a venue where the West could challenge the USSR and, in
1983, win further concessions on human rights. Nevertheless, the situation for
dissidents, who faced more intimidation, arrests, and harsh sentences, as well as
the prestige of the Soviet regime, deteriorated until Mikhail Gorbachev acceded to
the post of General Secretary nearly ten years after the signing of the Final Act.
Immediately after the signing of the Accords, things seemed to be under
control for Soviet leaders. They made minor improvements in compliance with
Basket III in the fall of 1975, somewhat easing restrictions on Western journalists

66

Jussi M. Hanhimaki, “Ironies and Turning Points, Détente in Perspective” in Westad ed.
Reviewing the Cold War (London, 2000), 335.

40

and sales on Western newspapers.67 While exit visa fees were lowered, fewer
were issued in 1975, allowing the Soviets to point to superficial progress without
making real concessions.68 The Soviets also complained to the US that Western
radio broadcasting into the Soviet Union was against the spirit of détente, and
urged the US to relax restrictions on entry visas.69 At first the Soviet Union was
able to use the Final Act to its advantage.
Soon however, the Soviet Union found itself on the defensive when it
came to human rights. The first blow was struck by dissidents within the USSR.
As Anatoly Dobrynin described, “The condition of Soviet dissidents certainly did
not change overnight, but they were definitely encouraged by this historic
document.”70 The passage of the Final Act did not turn things around 180 degrees
for the dissident movement, but it did spark an era of heightened interest and
attention. At first glance there appears to be continuity in the dissident movement
before and after Helsinki. Organizations in defense of human rights had existed in
the USSR before the convening of CSCE. A Committee for Defense of Human
Rights was established in 1970 by Valery Chalidze, which included Sakharov
among its members.71 The KGB reported that in 1975 “10,206 anti-Soviet,
ideologically harmful and slanderous anonymous documents were prepared and
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distributed by 1,629 authors,” In addition, the KGB uncovered “53 hostile
nationalistic and anti-social groups with 182 participants.” Even more had
allegedly been uncovered in 1974, a year before the Act was signed72 Already in
1971 there was an emphasis on human rights and transnational contact with
Sakharov as a focal point of activity and communication. A KGB report from
1971 decries Sakharov’s contacts with West and the use of Western broadcasts to
boost publicity for the “so-called” Human Rights Committee, warns of a stream
of letters to Sakharov and the committee offering support and complaints about
officials, and describes Sakharov’s apartment as becoming a place of pilgrimage
for people who have trouble with the regime. Some citizens allegedly came from
remote regions of the country to Moscow specifically to meet him.73
By the early 1970s the KGB had developed a particularly effective system
of crackdowns on dissent. It relied not only on the time-tested methods of
infiltration and informers but on a more systematized kind of intimidation,
referred to as “prophylactic work,” and the increased use of pseudo-psychiatry to
denigrate, isolate, and sometimes mentally torture determined dissenters.74 The
KGB reported that in 1975, they subjected about 20,000 people who committed
“politically harmful actions that did not contain a criminal intent,” to prophylactic
work, had over 25 dissidents, including Zionists, exiled from the country, and
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subjected 486 people to criminal punishment for political activity.75 One must be
careful, however, when relying on reports from the KGB to the political
authorities. Yuri Andropov, who became KGB director in 1967, was not above
exaggerating, as the experience of Czechoslovakia shows. Unfortunately, internal
KGB reports are harder to access. However, even if reports were distorted to
create a sense of alarm, KGB reports clearly show that the highest authorities
were concerned with the dissident movement.
In addition to dissidents, the KGB was also concerned about refuseniks,
some of whom would become prominent human rights activists. Refuseniks lived
a precarious existence as their applications for exit visas typically caused them to
lose their jobs and become bigger targets for anti-Semitic abuse. While refuseniks
and dissidents were distinct groups, the lines were often blurred, exemplified by
the case of Anatoly Shcharansky. Shcharansky had tried to emigrate in 1973 and
soon became involved in Jewish cultural life. Like many Jews, his application was
not approved. He then put his good English to work communicating with the West
and serving as Sakharov’s interpreter, and later helped found the Moscow
Helsinki Group. His public participation in the Group brought greater attention to
the plight of Soviet Jews and his subsequent imprisonment became a major
rallying call for human rights activists and Jewish advocates.76
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Despite a superficial appearance of continuity in dissident life, the CSCE
process did support an increase in dissident activity and attention given to it. By
1973 the Conference was already underway, and Soviet leaders were greatly
concerned with relations with the West. Concern with the CSCE appears to be
referred to when the KGB warns that Sakharov “persistently appeals to the West
not to embark on the course of rapprochement with the USSR without ‘extracting
from Soviet leadership concessions’ of an ideological and political nature.”
Through contacts in Western media Sakharov encouraged the West to not give the
Soviets what they wanted unless they agreed to improved human rights standards.
The KGB warned that punitive measures against Sakharov would “lead to
vigorous anti-Soviet outcries in the West, and may be met with less than full
understanding by some fraternal parties.” It would also require “additional
explanations inside the country.” 77 The international spotlight of the CSCE was
troublesome for Soviet authorities. Shortly before signing the Final Act, they
expressed concern that Sakharov would damage their prestige. With his
“distinctly provocative behavior” he hoped “either to press his point with the help
of the world community or to damage the prestige of the Soviet state on the eve of
the European conference.”78 Soviet internal behavior became more dependent on
foreign relations as the CSCE put more attention on their failures to maintain
international human rights standards.
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Sakharov himself perceived the importance of the CSCE and acted
accordingly. The KGB noted that by December 1975, when Sakharov met with
foreign journalists he “continually expressed the idea” that the Helsinki
conference presented opportunities for exerting pressure on the USSR. He told a
British journalist, “It is now very important to increase the pressure of the world
public opinion in defense of human rights in the Soviet Union…after the Helsinki
conference and after the award of the [Nobel] Peace Prize to me, I hope better
conditions have been created for such activity.” Sakharov explained that “the task
of the West is to use the tools it has at hand to assist the Soviet Union in fulfilling
its obligations.”79
Additionally, increased media attention owing to the CSCE changed how
the dissident movement operated. Much more international attention was paid to
the dissidents, and Soviet citizens could learn about them from foreign broadcasts.
One dissident wrote that the situation changed so dramatically that he no longer
had to find ways to interest the press in statements by refuseniks or dissidents, as
now “the correspondents literally tore them out of my hands.”80 Space was
opened up for dissent as a result of the Soviet Union’s conflicting commitment
between internal domination and good appearances required for effective foreign
policy.
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The Final Act served as a unifying platform and legitimizing document for
dissidents in the USSR, made more potent by the fact that they were championing
a document carrying Leonid Brezhnev’s signature. Activists within the USSR
soon established groups that based their platform on Helsinki principles.81 The
Act served to forge “a common ideological basis” between a variety of
oppositional groups, including religious freedom activists.82 Human rights
activists used the Final Act as their own set of principles. On May 13, 1976, Yuri
Orlov founded The Public Group to Support Compliance with the Helsinki
Accords in the USSR, often referred to as the Moscow Helsinki Group, in
Moscow.83
Yuri Orlov was no stranger to trouble. In the wake of Khrushchev’s
denunciation of Stalin, Orlov got on the authorities’ bad side for a speech he
delivered, a major theme of which was democracy on a foundation of socialism.84
After the “Czech tragedy” he felt he “had to do something,” and contacted the
Moscow dissidents. He met Sakharov in 1973 and shortly afterward got involved
in the founding of the Soviet Amnesty International Group. After being fired from
the scientific institute, he sent a protest letter to the Soviet Academy of Sciences
as well as to foreign correspondents because “without pressure from abroad any
internal protest was useless.”85
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The Moscow Helsinki Group immediately went to work providing
documentation to Western governments, while foreign radio broadcasts raised
awareness of the group and encouraged more Soviet citizens to appeal to
international organizations in defense of their rights. Orlov considered nearly all
the original members of the Moscow Helsinki Group to be “veterans” of the
human rights movement. He viewed the purpose of the group as changing what he
called the “Munich” approach of the West to détente. According to Orlov, “all the
democratic dissidents understood that only democratization of the USSR…could
ensure mutual security.” 86 The effectiveness of Helsinki commitments needed to
be nurtured by the dissident effect on Helsinki implementation. It gave the Act
grassroots meaning beyond international posturing.
While Sakharov supported the Moscow Helsinki Group, he preferred
operating independently to his previous experience with political groups. He
would sign documents that he agreed with and assist group members. Sakharov’s
wife, Elena Bonner, joined the group and became one of its most active members.
Though Sakharov had expressed anti-regime ideas independently, Bonner became
an important influence and partner after the two activists met in 1970. Soviet
authorities would unsuccessfully attempt to split the dynamic couple by creating
and spreading rumors, which they may have partially believed, that Bonner was
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unfaithful, unstable, and greedy, or that she was an agent of international Zionism
poisoning Sakharov’s mind.87
Shortly before founding the Moscow Helsinki Group, Orlov had met
Millicent Fenwick, a recently elected US Congresswoman traveling as part of an
official delegation to the USSR. He suggested to her that the West should use the
Helsinki Accords to pressure the Soviet government to honor its human rights
commitments and monitor compliance. Fenwick’s numerous meetings with Soviet
dissidents and refuseniks, which she described as “heartbreaking,” encouraged her
to initiate legislation to create the Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, a joint congressional-executive body to monitor compliance with the
Final Act. The Commission was established with Ford’s signature on June 3,
1976. Under the active leadership of Congressman Dante Fascell, the Commission
established compliance with the Final Act as a concern of the US government.
The Soviets opposed the establishment of the Commission on the grounds that it
was interfering in internal Soviet affairs and its emphasis on Basket III was not in
line with the CSCE principle that all baskets were equally important.88 Fenwick
had been involved in the civil rights movement prior to entering elected office,
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and would later consider the Commission on Human Rights to be the most
important part of her congressional career.89
The United States government soon took the offensive on human rights,
rather than downplaying human rights concerns as the Nixon and Ford
administrations had. Typically the language of the Final Act would be used and its
commitments would be referred to. The increase in Soviet dissident activity
coincided with changing attitudes toward the Final Act and a new presidential
administration in the United States. Sakharov appealed to the Final Act in letters
to Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter during the 1976 presidential campaign, arguing
that human rights were inseparable from problems of international peace or
economic progress. He also stated that the Helsinki agreement “opens new
opportunities for international initiatives, such as, for example, the struggle for a
general worldwide amnesty of political prisoners.” 90 The Carter administration
took up the task of pushing hard for Helsinki compliance. While Carter had
initially opposed the signing of the Final Act, during his campaign he began to see
it as a useful tool in challenging the Soviet Union’s human rights record. Shortly
after taking office, Carter pressed Brezhnev to comply with the Helsinki accords,
“We expect cooperation in the realization of further steps toward the fulfillment
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of the agreements reached in Helsinki relating to human rights.” He invited
“personal, confidential exchanges of views on these delicate questions.”91
Human rights were central to Carter’s foreign policy agenda. In his
inaugural address, which he drafted himself, he proclaimed that human rights
constituted “the new reality of our time” and “because we are free, we can never
be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere.”92 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter’s
national security advisor, wrote in his memoir that Carter “came to the presidency
with a determination to make foreign policy more humane and moral.” He
“deeply believed in human rights and that commitment remained constant during
his administration.”93 Brzezinski considered one of his primary objectives to
increase America’s ideological impact on the world, with a heavy emphasis on
human rights. He believed that the US should “redefine détente into a more
purposeful and activist policy for the West” and saw in human rights “an
opportunity to put the Soviet Union ideologically on the defensive.” He viewed
the USSR as becoming increasingly assertive under détente, and referenced
statements by Soviet officials like, “the policy of peaceful coexistence has nothing
in common with the ‘freezing’ of the social status quo, with any artificial
mothballing of the revolutionary process.”94 Brzezinski credits Carter’s policy
with establishing human rights as a global concern and having a major impact on
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US allies to relax repression, including releases of political prisoners in Latin
America.95
According to historian Svetlana Savranskaya, Carter’s interest in human
rights made him “undoubtedly the most respected foreigner among Soviet human
rights activists.”96 Shortly after Carter’s inauguration, Sakharov wrote to him
drawing attention to human rights abuses in the Soviet Union and listing a number
of political prisoners the US should make a priority.97 The administration
responded with a “carefully worded reply” that nonetheless met condemnation
from Brezhnev as “correspondence with a renegade who proclaimed himself an
enemy of the Soviet state.”98 Sakharov wrote years later that Carter’s commitment
to human rights still appeared to have been “serious and sincere,” and regretted
only that the Carter administration did not always act on this conviction in the
most effective manner.99
The US government was not alone in responding to Soviet dissidents. An
extensive movement emerged that used the final act as its founding ideology.100
An important group was the United States Helsinki Watch Committee, which
maintained contact with Helsinki activists in Eastern and Western Europe,
publicized failures to comply with the Final Act, and compiled reports that could
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be used in negotiation. Helsinki Watch proclaimed its mission as “monitoring US
compliance with the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Accords and
monitoring the freedom of others to do the same in their countries.” Its first
annual report raised issues of discrimination, civil liberties abuses, and rights of
untried prisoners in the United States and describes harsh repression in the Soviet
bloc.101 Sometimes Helsinki Watch and similar groups could more effectively
exert pressure in individual cases than states could, as image-conscious
governments that would stand firm in the face of pressure from an adversary
might otherwise be amenable to public opinion.102
While Helsinki Watch often worked with the US government, providing
information and advice, its reports suggest that human rights groups were
independent actors with interests that did not always align with the governments
they worked with. Helsinki Watch’s 1983 report noted that during the Carter
administration and the early years of the Reagan administration, the organization
enjoyed good relations with the State Department and its bureau of human rights
because their emphasis on human rights violations in the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe suited US foreign policy objectives. Cooperation decreased when
Helsinki Watch raised concerns of human rights violations in non-aligned
Yugoslavia, and when Helsinki Watch addressed human rights problems in
Turkey, it “came into direct conflict with the State Department.” Turkey was an
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important NATO member and a major recipient of US aid. The State Department
maintained that Turkey was in a transition to democracy, and Helsinki Watch was
unable to gain much support in Congress for condemning Turkey’s human rights
practices. Helsinki Watch charged that “the Reagan Administration’s selective
human rights policy has destroyed its credibility in the West and its effectiveness
in promoting human rights in the Eastern bloc countries,” and cooperated with
Americas Watch and the Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights to
publish a report “Failure: the Reagan Administration’s Human Rights Policy in
1983.”103 A later report on the Reagan administration’s human rights record
“found that the Administration was vigorous in denouncing abuses in countries
aligned with the Soviet Union or considered hostile to the US, but that these
denunciations were not part of an even-handed effort to promote human rights
worldwide, and were thus not as effective as they could have been.”104 The CSCE
inspired a flowering of non-government groups taking responsibility for
advocating Soviet human rights improvement. As these groups were independent
actors, they did not always take the same positions as the governments they
lobbied and were able to serve as continual institutions for maintaining concern
on human rights in the CSCE outside of the East-West contest.
While Helsinki activists were the most involved in promoting overall
Helsinki compliance, other private individuals and organizations pressured the
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Soviet Union’s human rights record, often referencing the Final Act. Scientific
and professional groups responded to the persecution of their counterparts in the
USSR by pledging to avoid working with the USSR, which was in need of
Western technology, until political prisoners were freed.105 Pressure from groups
of Western psychiatrists on Soviet punitive psychiatry was enough of a concern
that the KGB organized a campaign to counter it.106 By the 1970s, thousands of
American Jews had mobilized and marched in support of the rights of Soviet
Jews.107 French citizens, especially trade unionists, Trotskyists, and the antiauthoritarian left supported East European oppositionists, including by providing
clandestine support to Poland’s Solidarity movement.108 Statements by Western
communist parties broadcast by Western radio into the Soviet Union were
particularly troubling for Soviet leaders. The KGB recorded Sakharov as saying
“The position of the Italian communists corresponds to our views and
opinions.”109 In February 1976, they expressed concerns about the views that
“Communist party leaders of some capitalist countries hold on the question of
democracy.”110 Self-proclaimed communists criticizing or denouncing the Soviet
Union threatened the Communist Party of the Soviet Union’s pretensions of being
105
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the leader of global proletarian revolution. Helsinki activism took place within a
broader context of non-government transnational activism for upholding human
rights in the USSR, and the various currents of activism reinforced each other.
Soviet leaders did not respond favorably to pressure over their human
rights record. They had a different idea of human rights than the views prevailing
in the West and considered attempts to change their human rights policy to be
interference in their internal affairs that offended the spirit of détente. A draft
letter to Dobrynin from the central committee celebrated the Soviet Union’s
guarantee of “the right for work, education, social security, free medical
assistance, and retirement to all Soviet citizens” and decried “multi-million
unemployment, deprivation of rights of ethnic minorities, race discrimination,
unequal rights for women, the violation of citizens rights by the state organs, the
persecution of people with progressive convictions” in the West as well as
“systematic support by the USA of dictatorial, anti-populist regimes in some
countries.”111 KGB officials reported that human rights activism in the Soviet
Union was caused by foreign interference. They warned that “the adversary’s
special and propaganda services” were trying to create the appearance of “a socalled ‘internal opposition.’” in the USSR. The foreign conspirators allegedly
provided support for “those inspiring antisocial trends,” and “encouraged bringing
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together the participants of various tendencies of anti-Soviet activities.”112
Communist Party ideology colored the leadership’s perception of rights, their
perception of failures to uphold rights in the West, and the nature of the threat the
regime faced from human rights activism.
Helsinki activists in the USSR would not escape prosecution for long.
Yuri Orlov described that they were active for almost nine months while the KGB
was “busy preparing big cases against us.”113 The KGB maintained that the
Helsinki groups inflicted “serious political damage on the Soviet state”114 and
needed to be suppressed. In January 1977 the KGB urged the Central Committee
of the CPSU to approve arrests. Noting that the Moscow Helsinki group had not
been deterred by warnings, they emphasized the need to “take more decisive
measures.” The existence of a threat to the Soviet system was implied by the
KGB’s argument that punitive measures would influence the situation in
Czechoslovakia, Poland, and other allied countries “which are presently being
subjected to mass pressure from both hostile internal elements and international
imperialism.115 Orlov was arrested in February 1977 and sent to a brutal labor
camp after a farcical trial. He remained in the camp until February 1984 when he
was moved to a remote Siberian village, an improvement he thought was likely
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due to pressure exerted by Moscow dissidents and Westerners, particularly
scientists. He was eventually exiled to the United States.116
Human rights advocacy complicated East-West relations, but it was far
from the only reason for the breakdown of détente. Soviet leaders acknowledged
that the trial of dissidents Anatoly Scharansky and Alexander Ginzburg was a
major complicating factor in US-Soviet relations.117 Brzezinski recalled that
Soviet imprisonment of human rights activists hurt Soviet relations with Carter.
The trial of Shcharansky and Ginzburg, “both of whom enjoyed enormous
popularity” in the US, complicated a technology transfer deal. Ethnic groups,
especially Jews, tended to favor being hard on the Soviets, but “the business
community generally opposed any linkage between politics and trade.”118
However, the superpowers had other concerns as well. When Brezhnev decried
the “growing aggression of the foreign policy of the Carter government” at a 1978
Politburo meeting, he mentioned “attempts at clumsy interference in our internal
affairs,” but most of his concerns revolved around the arms race and US relations
with their rival China.119 Many of the concerns the leaders of the superpowers
expressed to each other revolved around questions of armaments and
interventions or deployments of forces around the globe.120 Human rights
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differences were one element of East-West conflict that reduced trust between the
superpowers within a broader ideological and geopolitical contest.
In the late 1970s and 1980s, CSCE Follow-up Meetings were the scenes of
diplomatic wrangling over the place of human rights in international relations.
The Final Act contained provisions for periodic follow-up meetings to the
conference in Helsinki, where delegates would review compliance with Final Act
provisions and discuss ways to improve inter-European relations. The CSCE was
a process which after 1975 “had to come up with concrete results in the form of
commitments which would go beyond previous undertakings” in order to validate
its continued existence as an institution.121 The focus on the human dimension in
the CSCE underscored the international concern for human rights and other
humanitarian issues. It was a shift that put relations between the individual and
the state on the same diplomatic level as state-to-state relations, “thus raising the
individual to the pan-European plane.”122 Heraclides characterizes Principle
Seven as stating “classical absolutes” of human rights while Basket III focused on
applying these absolutes into narrower, specific, “more modest undertakings.” In
CSCE follow-up meetings, an emphasis on the “absolutes” of Principle Seven
corresponded to the absolutist expression of principles by the United States
delegation, while West Europeans tended to take a more gradualist approach

121
122

Heraclides, Security and Cooperation in Europe, 3
Ibid., 2.

58

addressing incremental improvements, corresponding to the ideals of Basket
III.123
CSCE follow-ups functioned as forums of East-West confrontation.
Human rights failures of NATO member Turkey and non-aligned Yugoslavia
were rarely mentioned by Western delegations, and Romania, the most
independent member of the Warsaw Pact but hardly the least repressive, generally
received less criticism from the West than did the Soviet Union or its closer
allies.124 The US approach to human rights fit Brzezinski’s paradigm of increasing
the political cost for the Soviets of behavior the US considered harmful, partly
through “continued insistence on human rights as part of the ideological
competition.”125 The US delegation to the first follow-up meeting, held in
Belgrade from October 4, 1977 to March 8 1978, was headed by Arthur Goldberg,
an experienced lawyer, former Supreme Court justice, secretary of labor, and
ambassador to the United Nations.126 Goldberg emphatically established human
rights as a major concern of the CSCE and employed research from Helsinki
activists to lambast the Soviet Union and its allies for human rights failures,
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taking an approach that even Western allies sometimes considered overly
aggressive.127
Before the next CSCE follow-up meeting, East-West relations were hurt
by events which drew the iron curtain tighter, making it harder for diplomats and
dissidents to achieve their goals. On Christmas Eve 1979, six months after after
Carter and Brezhnev met in Vienna, Soviet military forces entered Afghanistan.
With Brezhnev’s health in decline, Soviet policy was increasingly under the
influence of Gromyko, Andropov, and the hawkish defense minister Dmitry
Ustinov, but Brezhnev ultimately signed off on the strike. Shocked by the brash
show of force and believing that the Soviets intended to move on the Persian Gulf
and its oil resources, Carter froze relations with the Soviets, imposed a grain
embargo, and announced a boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games.
Western Europe, though not as immediately or harshly as the US, cooled relations
with the USSR.128 The heightened mistrust and hostility
The United States continued its confrontational approach at the second
CSCE Follow-up meeting, this time with a delegation headed by Max
Kampelman. Burdened by heightened Cold War tensions as well as the continuing
inability to agree on human rights commitments, the Madrid Follow-up Meeting
lasted from November 1980 to September 1983. Kampelman, with years of
political involvement behind him, was working privately as a lawyer in 1980
when Vice President Mondale invited him to head the delegation at Madrid,
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promising it would only be a few months of service. In a 2003 interview
Kampelman admitted that at first he did not know what was going on in Madrid.
After speaking for a bit he realized it was a follow up to the conference attended
by Arthur Goldberg three years earlier in Belgrade. Despite recalling that
Goldberg considered it a miserable experience, he agreed to go.129 He viewed his
mission as the “same kind of fight” as the struggle of “Communism versus
Democracy” he had experienced in the labor movement and in the Democratic
Party of Minnesota in the immediate post-war era. The United States, “had to take
a leadership position” in the role of promoting democracy and human rights.130
US-Soviet relations did not improve with the election of Ronald Reagan, a
longtime advocate of tougher relations with the USSR. Reagan, however, was not
only a staunch Cold Warrior who ratcheted up the arms race and ramped up antiCommunist rhetoric and interventions, but also an idealist with the conviction that
a strong America would prevail because its way of life would prove more
attractive. Unlike many of his advisors he saw value in negotiating with the Soviet
Union. His June 1982 appointment of George Shultz to replace Alexander Haig as
Secretary of State began to shift the balance toward cooperation. Though Reagan
would famously call the Soviet Union an “evil empire” in March of 1983, he
privately assured Shultz that he supported Shultz’s approach to engaging in
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constructive dialogue with Soviet leaders.131 Shultz, however, would be given
little room to act on new ideas until Reagan’s second term.132
Kampelman’s ability to work with the Reagan administration
demonstrated continuity in the US approach to the CSCE from Carter to Reagan,
which was not entirely expected. Reagan, in a 1976 address, had lambasted the
Final Act as “putting our stamp of approval on Russia’s enslavement of the
captive nations.”133 Yet Reagan came to see the Final Act as a useful tool in
pressuring the Soviets. Kampelman, despite his longtime affiliation with the
Democratic Party, was kept at his post after Reagan took office in 1981. Reagan’s
first Secretary of State, Alexander Haig expressed approval for Kampelman’s
work and encouraged him to continue.134 Kampelman and Reagan did have a
political affinity; both, for example, were members of the Committee on the
Present Danger, a bipartisan foreign policy group that supported military buildup
and taking a hard line against the USSR.135
In light of the criticism of Reagan’s human rights record by Helsinki
Watch and others, it would seem plausible to conclude that the Reagan
administration was hypocritical and only used human rights issues to berate the
Soviets. Even Dobrynin wrote that neither Reagan nor Haig were especially
committed to the rights of Soviet dissidents (in contrast to Carter), although they
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would play that card from time to time.136 However, it is likely that the longtime
investment in anti-Communist ideology led Reagan and many of his advisors to
believe that Soviet power was a greater threat to freedom than anything that a
capitalist or non-aligned state would do. Reagan’s focus on the Pentecostal
Christians trying to flee Soviet persecution and his increasing warmth as political
prisoners were released suggested that Soviet human rights violations were major
impediments for him to trust the Soviet Union. Many of his advisors, however,
remained convinced that the goal of the Soviet Union was global Communist
domination and the cause of freedom required supporting a lesser evil here and
there.
As the Madrid meeting languished, Kampelman was able to employ quiet
diplomacy as well as grandstanding condemnation. He had gone to Madrid intent
on naming names and challenging the Soviet bloc. When West German foreign
minister Genscher, remembering the experience with Goldberg, expressed
concern prior to the opening of the meeting, Kampelman told him to think of the
NATO bloc as an orchestra: “We're going to blow the horn. If you don't want to
blow the horn, you do it your way. But let's make music together.”137 Kampelman
was also able to employ quiet diplomacy. Desiring to have more than a statement
come out of Madrid, Kampelman proposed to President Reagan that he quietly
push the USSR for the release of political prisoners. The United States would not
allow the passage of a concluding document for the Madrid meeting unless an
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acceptable list of political prisoners was released. Reagan approved, and
suggested a number of Pentecostal Christians taking refuge in the US embassy as
well as a number of Jewish refuseniks. According to Kampelman, the KGB
officer at Madrid insisted on secrecy. Kampelman was not to tell anybody about
the deal they were making except Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz.
When Kampelman asked if Dobrynin should be informed, he was told, “No, he
sticks his nose into everything.” After a series of negotiations the US secured the
release of numerous political prisoners. The Madrid CSCE Follow-Up began the
US practice of requiring tangible human rights progress, usually the release of
prisoners, before making concessions to the Soviets.138
Finally, after a recess from February to November 1982 in protest of the
imposition of martial law in Poland, and with the cloud of the Soviets’ downing
of a Korean airliner hanging over the proceedings, the Madrid meeting closed on
September 9, 1983.139 Kampelman later characterized the meeting as taking
advantage of an “ought.” With the Final Act asserting the ways countries ought to
behave, signatories had the right to say, “Move your 'is' to the 'ought'.”140 The
concluding document signed at Madrid by delegates from the the 35 CSCE states
supplemented the Final Act with more explicit protocols and expectations for
human rights and human contacts.141 At the first CSCE Follow-Up, the West, led
by Goldberg, established human rights compliance as a primary concern of CSCE
138
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follow-ups. The Madrid meeting built on this commitment as NATO members
practiced greater cohesion than they did at Belgrade and secured more explicit
commitments while quiet diplomacy by the US delegation secured the release of
political prisoners.
Transnational activism helped put the Soviet Union on the defensive in
Madrid even more than was the case in Belgrade. Dozens of NGOs and numerous
dissidents, human rights activists, and ethnic group representatives attended the
Madrid conference. Helsinki Watch, active throughout the meeting, held press
conferences and published editorials, establishing the importance of human rights
compliance in the public discourse.142 Activists also influenced the Madrid
meeting by providing the delegations with information on violations. Kampelman
characterized his approach to the meeting as acting like a lawyer. Whether
discussing anti-Semitism, trade unions, psychiatric abuse, or any other topic, he
wanted to have numerous examples to point to, and not just raise charges. He
believed this approach made confrontation more acceptable to US allies “because
I wasn't engaged in insults, but facts.”143
US-led condemnation in the CSCE process put Soviet leaders on the
defensive. In Madrid, the Eastern bloc tried to move the debate away from
compliance with past agreements by emphasizing new proposals. Generally they
took a defensive posture of protesting “interference” in their internal affairs.144
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The Soviets had lost the initiative in international diplomacy. Despite the apparent
triumph at Helsinki they found their hegemony was being challenged.
After the breakdown of détente, human rights advocacy in the CSCE
framework continued to have an effect, although the fate of Soviet dissidents was
generally grim. Reports on human rights in the USSR grew increasingly bleak in
the first half of the 1980s. In 1982, Soviet authorities moved to suppress the few
remaining members of the Moscow Helsinki Group and in September the
Moscow Helsinki Group declared that it would discontinue its activities. 145
However, the Soviet Union continued to be sensitive to outside pressure on
human rights. Amid renewed Cold War tensions in 1983, the US CSCE
delegation secured the release of several Soviet political prisoners. During this
period the situation of children in religious families improved somewhat.146
In addition to diplomacy and political activism centered on international
conferences, the CSCE also strengthened pressures for change in the USSR by
fostering increases in social and cultural contacts. The Iron Curtain was no longer
as solid as it had once been, partly due to the increased contact that the CSCE
helped establish. Commercial ties expanded and visitors flowed from country to
country, increasing the impact of “globalizing influences and integrationist
processes.”147 Politburo members raised concerns about the Reagan
administration and American press and television “opening a strong anti-soviet
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propaganda” regarding Jews in the USSR.148 Western radio continued to be
popular for entertainment and news. The commitments to fostering human
contacts, an important point of contention in the debates in drafting the Final Act,
turned out to be important in continuing peaceful pressure on the Soviet system
after diplomatic contacts grew colder.
Soviet documents suggest that even the shocking January 1980 exile of
Andrei Sakharov to the isolated city of Gorky was less to demonstrate Soviet
power and insult the West than it was the result of fears regarding his meetings
with foreigners, whether Western correspondents and officials or members of the
Polish or Czechoslovak opposition. Claiming that 1,200 anti-Soviet radio
broadcasts from Western stations were made using materials Sakharov provided,
the KGB wanted to prevent him from sending written appeals to the West. They
remained concerned that despite his “crimes,” putting Sakharov on trial could
entail “grave political complications.” During the time it would take to formally
investigate a case and conduct a trial, at least two months, they expected the West
“to stir up clamorous anti-Soviet campaigns which would be difficult to counter,
because legislation governing procedure in criminal cases prohibits the use of
materials from cases under investigation for the purposes of propaganda before
the proceedings have been completed.” Instead it seemed expedient to “apply
administrative measures in the Sakharov case that would make it possible to halt
his contacts with foreigners and to seriously hamper his hostile activity,”
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including as “a preventive measure his expulsion from Moscow to a part of the
country closed to foreigners.” Whether or not the procedural requirements of a
trial would have actually hindered propaganda efforts or if this was just a selfserving justification, it appears that the Sakharov exile was not merely punitive or
meant to set an example, but was intended to isolate him and stifle his work that
harmed the regime.149 In his new residence the KGB prevented foreigners and
“anti-social elements” from meeting him.150 Soviet leaders understood dissidence
as a threat directly related to the Cold War and not just an internal problem.
Elena Bonner came to be a more immediate concern when she served as
Sakharov’s messenger from Gorky to contacts with the West. Although her
involvement in the circulation of Sakharov’s articles made her liable to criminal
punishment, it was deemed inexpedient to immediately launch a criminal case
against her, “since it would provide the adversary with additional material for
speculating on Sakharov’s persecution.”151 Instead, personal searches would be
used to confiscate materials. International concern was not the only factor in
Soviet leniency. The KGB noted that allowing Bonner to travel to Italy would be
“tactically justified” because it would arouse “surprise and envy on the part of her
and Sakharov's accomplices, and this leads to greater discords and hostility within
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their milieu.”152 Whether or not Soviet leaders believed they were acting
humanely toward Sakharov and Bonner, increased sensitivity toward Western
concerns impacted the way they were treated.
Despite the seeming permanence of the Iron Curtain, gradual changes
were set in motion by the CSCE process and the activists who helped establish
human rights as a fundamental concern. By disputing the legitimacy of Soviet
communism by broadcasting its failures, they were able to undermine the
ideological mission of the USSR. Human rights advocacy within the Soviet Union
and from abroad prevented the Final Act from being an ideological success for the
Soviet Union. While dissidents did not immediately succeed in making major
changes to the Soviet system they did form a potential center of opposition that
could be expressed when the grip of repression was loosened. Their opportunity
would come after a new General Secretary ascended to power in the Soviet
Union, and a new era in Soviet domestic and foreign policy began to emerge.
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Chapter 3:
Iron Curtain Opens, Iron Fist Loosens, 1985-1989

The succession of Mikhail Gorbachev to General Secretary on March 11,
1985 began a new era in domestic and foreign policy. In a vain attempt to renew
the appeal of Soviet socialism through a top-down process of restructuring, the
Soviet leadership unleashed social forces that they were unable to harness and
soon escaped from their control. Gorbachev hoped to reinvigorate the USSR after
a long period of stagnation, which required revitalizing the economy, establishing
a political situation that rewarded initiative and competence, and energizing
Soviet society. He sought a foreign policy conducive to domestic reform, which
required ending the drain of the arms race and reducing the power of the militaryindustrial complex. Under his leadership the Soviet Union adopted Western
human rights norms, and in his advocacy for a common European home
Gorbachev referred to Helsinki principles. As Gorbachev and his New Thinking
comrades looked west, the principles established in the CSCE process served as
admission standards to the European order they hoped to join. The CSCE was an
important influence on Soviet reform, which opened the door to an increased
dissident effect on foreign and domestic policy.
Curiously, part of the reason for Gorbachev’s rise to the top level of power
at a comparatively young age was his relationship with Yuri Andropov, the
suspicious hardliner who had engineered the crackdown on the dissident
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movement. Andropov was originally from the Stavropol region, where Gorbachev
lived, and they met regularly during the 1970s while Gorbachev headed the
Stavropol Communist Party. Paradoxically, though Andropov was ruthless in
cracking down on people he viewed as threats to the Soviet system, he also
appeared to believe that corruption and stagnation threatened the system, and
instituted mild reforms during his brief period as General Secretary from
November 1982 until his death in February 1984.153 Anatoly Chernyaev, who
became an important Gorbachev aide, recorded that many people in the Soviet
leadership had “great expectations for Andropov” for similar reasons they
expected Gorbachev would provide competent and energetic leadership. The
selection of Chernenko, who was associated with “Brezhnevism” and
complacency, to succeed Andropov was a disappointment. Upon Chernenko’s
death little more than a year later, Gorbachev’s nomination was met with a
massive outburst of applause because “the people [were] tired of stagnation and
demonstrations of official stupidity.”154 Already it appeared likely that change
would come to the Soviet system, though even Gorbachev did not know exactly
what change would look like.
Change in foreign policy came soon. At first the Soviets continued to act
defensively on human rights. The first CSCE meeting entirely devoted to human
rights, the Ottawa Meeting of Experts on Human Rights, was held from April 7 to
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June 17, 1985, where the Soviets were the target of Western criticism. Their
routine damage control included retorting with human rights shortcomings of
critics which often rang hollow or sounded contrived.155 Gorbachev’s July 1985
appointment of Eduard Shevardnadze to replace Andrei Gromyko as Minister of
Foreign Affairs marked a new era in foreign policy. Shevardnadze had held a
number of positions in the Georgian Communist Party, culminating in his
leadership of the Georgian party as First Secretary, but he had little experience in
foreign affairs. However, Gorbachev had long trusted him and was eager for a
fresh approach to foreign policy.156 In his memoir, Shevardnadze wrote that he
“knew many people in the dissident movement in Georgia quite well” and spoke
with them a number of times. He stated that while many of their complaints were
beyond his power to change, he managed to keep “hundreds of young people” out
of harm’s way by having open debates when he could have had people
prosecuted.157 Shevardnadze proved himself to be a capable minister and an
adamant reformer.
Shevardnadze considered his primary objective to “create the maximum
favorable external conditions needed in order to conduct internal reform.”158 At
the time of his appointment it was unclear what reforms were to be made, as the
full agenda of perestroika took time to develop. The early focus appeared to be on
economic restructuring and acceleration and improved viability and rationality.
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Helsinki Watch received information on new political trials in1985, which
illustrated to them that human rights policies had not changed under
Gorbachev.159 It was unclear how far Gorbachev thought he would go or how far
he really wanted to go. Yet as early as October, Soviet observers sensed a change.
Chernayev noted in a diary entry that “in trying to show good intentions to
Europe, we are changing too”160
Gorbachev had been heavily influenced by his experiences abroad and the
people he met in his travels. Starting in the late 1960s his party rank enabled him
to travel extensively in Europe.161 Some of his most important contacts were with
foreign leftists. In June 1984 Gorbachev led the Soviet delegation to the funeral of
Italian Communist Party leader Enrico Berlinguer. Gorbachev came away
impressed with the PCI, and wanted to establish closer relations. The PCI had
been openly sympathetic to the Prague spring, condemned the Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia, and rejected Moscow domination of the international communist
movement.162 When Gorbachev met in early 1989 with Italian Communist leader
Acille Occhetto, he was pressed on Helsinki compliance in the Soviet satellites.163
Willy Brandt and Spain’s Socialist Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez helped
Gorbachev develop his views of socialism with a democratic direction. But it was
not only the political left that influenced Gorbachev. He would refer to his
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December 1984 trip to Great Britain as “eye-opening” and the beginning of a
“good personal relationship” with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.164
Importantly, he would also come to have good personal relations with Ronald
Reagan.
Gorbachev also looked for advice from Soviet officials who understood
the world abroad. For example, in the 1970s Alexander Yakovlev fell out of favor
among Brezhnev’s circle and took the post of Soviet ambassador to Canada as a
kind of political exile. Gorbachev met him on a trip abroad and in 1983
Gorbachev had Yakovlev appointed to director of the Institute of World Economy
and International Relations (IMEMO) research organization.165 Yakovlev would
serve as an important adviser and partisan of the perestroika reform program.
Another important reformer among Gorbachev’s advisors was Anatoly
Chernyaev, a foreign policy expert who among other duties had written some
speeches for Brezhnev. Gorbachev selected him as an aide in February 1986 and
he would become one of Gorbachev’s closest advisors.166 It should also be noted
that Gorbachev was accompanied by his wife Raisa on all his foreign trips starting
in 1984, and the two of them discussed everything.167 Gorbachev’s experiences,
relations, and leadership style led him to greater understanding of the opinions,
expectations, and reality of the world beyond the Iron Curtain.
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In 1986 changes in the Soviet Union’s approach to human rights became
more apparent. Already during the Bern CSCE Meeting of Experts on Human
Contacts, held in April and May, a more positive Soviet attitude was noticed.168
Gorbachev met with US Congressmen Fascell and Broomfield on April 4, where
they discussed the Afghanistan war and human rights and “set the stage for future
dialogue” between the superpowers. Chernyaev believed this meeting hardened
Gorbachev’s “already existing resolve to end ‘the Sakharov affair.’”169 When
American conditions to hold the Reykjavik summit included the release of 25
prisoners, the Soviet response, developed at a September 1986 politburo meeting
was to institute incremental releases, including Orlov one month later. Yet the
Soviets also rhetorically attacked the US administration as saboteurs of
peacemaking efforts and criticized America “on the usual grounds: the homeless,
crime on the streets, unemployment, racism, violating human rights in the Third
World, etc.”170 Gorbachev wanted to take the initiative in foreign policy and
prevent a perception that events were being driven by the United States. Soviet
moves in 1986 met with cautious optimism from Helsinki Watch, which noted
that “In 1986, as Mr. Gorbachev consolidated his power, the situation began to
change.” The USSR had demonstrated “increased flexibility” in the field of
human rights.171
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A new human rights regime, along with big strides in disarmament efforts,
breathed new life into Soviet diplomacy and also served as part of an effort to
recharge domestic excitement for the Soviet system that had waned during the
period of stagnation. Shevardnadze surprised George Shultz by taking the
initiative on human rights in discussions. Previously the topic of human rights
“had been the American’s favorite hobbyhorse, and a taboo for us.”172 Gorbachev
found it desirable to take ideological initiative for the USSR and undercut
Western hard-liners. In Politburo discussions Gorbachev emphasized the need to
make the Soviet Union attractive. “We need to work out a conception on human
rights, both at home and abroad.” It was necessary to put an end to the routine
because it “only produces dissidents.” In October 1986 he directed the Politburo
to “see what we can do” on human rights. “We need to open a way back to the
Soviet Union for thousands of emigrants, to move this current in the opposite
direction.”173
The desire to increase enthusiasm for the Soviet Union at home and
abroad was a major factor when Soviet leaders weighed the costs and benefits of
releasing Sakharov and Bonner from exile. Gorbachev and Yakovlev believed
that neither the democratization of the country nor normal relations with the
outside world would be possible while Sakharov remained in exile, but they
needed to act delicately to not upset party conservatives or give the KGB an
opportunity to block the move. On December 16 Gorbachev telephoned Sakharov
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to personally inform him and his wife that their internal exile ended.174 They
expected that the couple would again engage in opposition activity but despite the
possible consequences, “Sakharov's return to Moscow will entail fewer political
costs than his continued isolation in Gorky.”175 For the new Soviet leadership now
ready to make big changes, isolating Sakharov was a bigger obstacle to their goals
than allowing Sakharov to be politically active and free to meet foreigners in
Moscow.
The effect of the dissident movement and Helsinki activism on the
initiation of reform is hard to judge. A Moscow human rights activist summed up
the situation in 1984 as, “the movement never became a mass movement and the
immediate demands of the dissidents were almost wholly frustrated.”176 However,
dissident voices were widely known through underground publications and
Western radio broadcasts. Chernayev believed “Gorbachev’s preparation for a
break with the primitive, falsified, official Party version of Soviet history” was his
serious reading of samizdat (unsanctioned self-published works) and tamizdat
(works published abroad), as well as restricted Progress publications for the
elite.177 Sakharov’s early samizdat essay Progress, Coexistence, and Intellectual
Freedom was widely read and discussed among reformist thinkers.178 It is difficult
to evaluate the effect that dissident publications had on future reformers, as
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opposed to their own experiences trying to get anything useful done in the Soviet
system. Tracing influences is not a straightforward process when there are so
many factors involved and much of the source material consists of subjective
statements with potential to be self-serving. However, in light of their wide
audience it is likely that dissidents had some effect on the way reformers
understood the nature of the problem.
It is easier to see the effect of dissidents after Gorbachev opened the gates
in 1985 and 1986. Social forces released in Gorbachev’s efforts to invigorate
Soviet society, spurred on by the Chernobyl disaster as well as by Gorbachev’s
increasing confidence, were influenced by dissidents who would again become
active, this time as participants in a broader reform movement. 179 The KGB, who
continued to monitor Sakharov and Bonner, noted that the troublesome couple
was becoming active in newly emerging civil society organizations, including the
Moscow Tribune, a political science study group, and Memorial, which
commemorated the victims of Stalinism and encouraged further democratization
of the Soviet system. A participant in Memorial’s founding believed the group
should be the heir of the Helsinki Watch Group and actively defend human rights
in the USSR and abroad.180 The KGB was alarmed in 1989 that a mining strike
committee was distributing information about Sakharov’s support for the strike.
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“Great significance is attached to his endorsement of the political demands
submitted by the miners, as well as of the decisiveness and purposefulness of their
actions.”181 In addition, Boris Yeltsin’s removal from Communist Party
leadership in late 1987 started a process that would bring him into contact with
former dissidents and other radicals.182
The dissident effect was prominent in the 1989 Congress of People’s
Deputies, elected in the first truly competitive elections in Soviet history.
Televised sessions were seen by an estimated 200 million people.183 Sakharov
was an active, outspoken member of the Congress, and garnered much support.184
The presence of a leading dissident, who had for years been a symbol of
conscience rallying the West, as a prominent member of the Soviet Union’s first
elected government body with any power, heralded a major change in the human
rights situation. Yuri Orlov, certainly not a neutral observer, held that dissidents
provided the moral example to the “fourth Russian Revolution” that was
underway.185 When Sakharov died in December 1989, his memorial service might
not have brought out the massive numbers of supporters that democrats hoped for,
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but it was still attended by tens of thousands of people.186 Considering the dismal
showing that sitting Communist party officials made when up for popular
election, the dissidents’ lack of association with the current system may have
gained them popular legitimacy and credibility as outsiders.187 While, like most
Soviet citizens they lacked experience in politics, they came to the era of
perestroika and glasnost already having a developed message of further
democratization, and they had networks of associates with experience working
together and organizing. Earlier manifestos and movements could be handy in
crafting alternatives that were needed as reforms bogged down.
Dissidents also had an effect on Western diplomacy throughout the era of
Gorbachev’s reforms. In the spring of 1986, three months after his release from a
Soviet labor camp into exile abroad, Anatoly Shcharansky toured the United
States. When speaking to Jewish organizations, the Reagan administration, and
Congress, he advocated a strategy of using both public and quiet diplomacy to
defend human rights and the Jewish community in the Soviet Union.188 When
Elena Bonner travelled to the West in early 1986 she participated in press
conferences, panels, and meetings with foreign leaders. Bonner and Shcharansky
urged American officials to continue using the Helsinki process to discuss human
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rights questions and defend human rights.189 Orlov also had an influence on
Western diplomacy. He had a discussion with Reagan and Shultz shortly before
the Reykjavik summit and travelled to the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting with
Catherine Fitzpatrick from Helsinki Watch. The position he took on a Soviet
proposal to hold a human rights meeting in Moscow was that the West should
agree to attend with strong conditions, which is the course that the West would
take.190 While dissidents were not driving policy either at superpower summits or
at CSCE gatherings, they were sought for advice on upholding human rights.
The third CSCE follow-up meeting, which was held in Vienna from
November 4,1986, to January 19, 1989, formed the backdrop for much of this
period. The Vienna conference not only measured the Soviet Union’s
improvement in human rights but became a driving force in Soviet reforms. The
conference began inauspiciously. Anatoly Marchenko, a Soviet dissident who had
recently written to CSCE delegates about human rights abuses in the Soviet
Union, died in prison shortly after the conference began. Then, Shevardnadze
shocked the attendees by proposing a human rights conference in Moscow in his
opening statement.191 The proposal was officially submitted a month later, and the
Soviet delegation was vague as to what the goals of the conference would be. A
year of unproductive debate ensued as Western delegations heavily criticized the

189

Chebrikov to the Central Committee; Bonner in the West; Sakharov on the Chernobyl accident,
June 18, 1986,Yale Annals of Communism, Andrei Sakharov KGB File, Doc 189.
190
Orlov, Dangerous Thoughts, 300-301, 304-305.
191
Snyder, Human Rights Activism, 175-177.

81

USSR.192 Shevardnadze writes that he “was convinced that the conference was
essential in order to show the world how far we intended to go and, beyond that,
to provide an impetus for democratization and the perestroika of legislation in
everything related to human affairs.” Not surprisingly many of his Politburo
colleagues had difficulty accepting his argument that signing the Final act meant
assuming obligations and acknowledging the right of other signatories to review
their compliance, and “stormy debates” ensued.193 Whether or not Shevardnadze
is revealing all of the motivations and this wasn’t another example of diplomacy
as a tactical maneuver against the class enemy, the proposal remained and served
as a commitment to holding a meeting so long as the West would accept, which
they would only do if the Soviets demonstrated concrete improvements.
As the Vienna conference went on, the Soviets gradually showed better
human rights observance as Gorbachev cautiously advanced his reform program.
Snyder writes that “for many observers, progress on the proposed Moscow
conference served as a barometer of Eastern advancement on human rights” since
the formal conference proposal, and thus agreement on a concluding document
was conditioned on Soviet progress in human rights.194 The CSCE came to serve
as an international body reviewing the progress of perestroika and measuring
reform. The Soviets began to hold more meetings with the press, to accept lists of
refuseniks and political prisoners, and to meet with NGOs and activists. Though
part of the changed behavior was likely a cynical attempt to show cosmetic
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changes, the Soviets demonstrated increased sensitivity to human rights concerns,
and they would be continually pressed for improvement. In 1987 the USSR took
meaningful steps including releasing some political prisoners, acting on family
reunification cases, and curbing radio jamming. They also responded for the first
time to the US Congressional Helsinki Commission, resolving 137 of the 442
cases the commission presented, and even began responding to Helsinki Watch.195
Jeri Laber, chair of Helsinki Watch, celebrated that “Reforms we had demanded
as conditions for the Moscow human rights conference…had actually come to
pass.”196
The Vienna conference closed on January 19, 1989, with the West
agreeing to meet in Moscow after first holding conferences on the human
dimension in Paris and Copenhagen. The West had held the Soviets to their word.
The USSR released numerous political prisoners and issued exit visas with much
less restriction. Afterward Gorbachev showed a greater commitment to human
rights than external pressure required.197 The Paris Conference on the Human
Dimension, from May 30 to June 23, 1989 was “characterized by a good
atmosphere, with very limited conflict among East-West lines.”198 Human rights
moved from an element of East-West confrontation to a more collaborative
endeavor.

195

Snyder, Human Rights Activism, 182-184, 191, 195.
Ibid., 214.
197
Ibid., 215.
198
Heraclides, Security and Cooperation in Europe, 110.
196

83

By 1989, the Soviet human rights situation had drastically improved,
partly due to foreign pressure. Chernyaev remarked, “Paradoxical as it may seem,
efforts toward disarmament and new relations with the West – originally meant
‘to create favorable external conditions for perestroika’ – in fact became its
locomotive” as contacts with Western Europe impacted the democratization
process.199 Reformers sometimes found foreign pressure useful. One Gorbachev
aide remarked that “Gorbachev’s team, which was pushing for internal reforms, in
particular in the area of emigration policy, used US requests in the humanitarian
field as a lever in our internal debates.”200 Helsinki Watch reports on the Soviet
Union adopted an increasingly hopeful tone, especially in contrast to the dismal
feeling of the early 1980s. By 1989 a sense of triumphalism is apparent, combined
with reminders of the need for continued monitoring including “in the Soviet
Union, where problems persist.” Soviet reforms were described as contradictory,
hesitant, and shuffling.201
When Gorbachev invoked the “idea of the common European home” in
his July 1989 speech to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, he praised the
Helsinki process. He characterized Europe as paying its debts to humankind for
colonialism and world war by pressing for changes in international relations in the
spirit of humanism, equality, and justice, and by setting an example of democracy
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and social achievements.202 Gorbachev credited the Helsinki process with
initiating this “immense effort of world significance.” He pronounced a position
on human rights in international diplomacy that was nearly the complete opposite
from that of Brezhnev.
“A world in which military arsenals would be cut but in which human
rights would be violated cannot feel secure. We, for our part, have arrived
at this conclusion finally and irrevocably.”203
Gorbachev hailed the Vienna conference as “a genuine breakthrough.”
Gorbachev’s presentation of human rights did not conflict with his socialist ideals,
and importantly, CSCE terminology accommodated an approach that could be
characterized as universal and humanitarian instead of Western and capitalist.
Soviet human rights policy had shifted into a non-confrontational, cooperative
framework by acknowledging the legitimacy of the role of human rights in
diplomacy and international security.
The CSCE process figures large among foreign influences on Soviet
human rights improvement. A meeting of Warsaw Pact representatives in the
summer of 1989 paid special attention to the process of building a “pan-European
home” while analyzing the results of the recent CSCE meetings. Emphasis was
placed “on the interests and values common for the European peoples, on the need
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for equal dialogue and an enhancement of contacts in various areas.”204
Shevardnadze characterized Soviet foreign policy as having “graduated from the
‘academy of Europe,’ the school of the Helsinki process.”205 Heraclides is
cautious to avoid making firm judgment on the effect of Helsinki. He notes that
many public pronouncements should be treated with caution, for they are at least
partly self-serving: “Participants are expected to praise the CSCE in a CSCE
meeting, and a CSCE document is bound to praise the process.” Nonetheless he
considers it “reasonable” for the CSCE to take some credit, and “without doubt it
provided a framework on which to build a new pan-European regime when the
time came in 1989-90.”206
The increased trust that was fostered by responsiveness in human rights
issues helped end the East-West confrontation. Gorbachev’s “anti-Fulton” address
to the United Nations in December 1988 not only declared a unilateral withdrawal
of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe and massive reductions in armed forces, but
also promised to expand participation in human rights monitoring of the UN and
CSCE and pledged to end arrests for political purposes. The speech met with
massive applause and prompted Shultz to remark that Gorbachev had declared the
Cold War over.207 The place of human rights in the easing of superpower tensions
is indicated by a February 1989 cable by US Ambassador to the Soviet Union
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Jack Matlock. He underscored that the most central US interest remained “the
long-term transformation of the Soviet Union into a society with effective organic
constraints on the use of military force outside its borders.” Human rights “must
of course remain a key element in US policy” but many human rights issues could
now be approached “under the rubric of ‘cooperation’ rather than
confrontation.”208 Yet disagreement in the US intelligence community remained
about Soviet sincerity and the permanence of Soviet policy changes. A 1989
National Intelligence Estimate highlighted these disagreements and emphasized
that “for the foreseeable future, the USSR will remain the West’s principle
adversary.”209 Nevertheless, relations improved. CSCE Negotiations after 1989
onwards were “no longer bloc-to-bloc.” Central and East Europe states under new
non-communist leadership became protagonists in the human dimension.210
Problems did persist in the Soviet Union. The country had yet to fully reach
Helsinki standards, the military and KGB were sometimes operating behind the
back of political leadership, and a humanitarian crisis loomed.211 Nevertheless, by
the end of 1989 the USSR had made substantial progress in upholding human
rights and its foreign policy had made human rights no longer a point of
competition, but instead in item of cooperation.
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Conclusion:
One Important Factor

The CSCE process, including contributions from dissidents, diplomats,
politicians, and activists, had a direct influence on facilitating change in the Soviet
Union, and in fostering the East-West trust and reconciliation that was crucial for
ending the Cold War. It was a gradual process and perhaps not the most important
factor, but the Helsinki process helped establish human rights advocacy as a more
prominent feature of the East-West divide, a part that opened itself to the
participation of private groups and individuals. From high level diplomacy and
also from below, pressure mounted on the Soviet leadership that finally found
traction when the system was opened to reform and reconciliation.
Because human rights cooperation took place concurrently with the end of
Cold War confrontation, it should be considered whether human rights advocacy
was a driving force in ending the Cold War or whether the thawing of the Cold
War, with an easing of the arms race and decreasing mistrust, expansionism, and
ideological hostility made cooperation on human rights possible. The answer is
not clear. Progress in the Soviet Union’s human rights practices was one factor in
gaining Western trust, but not the only one. The increase in East-West trust that
made an end to the Cold War confrontation more achievable also made further
cooperation on human rights more achievable. The human rights contest was one
aspect of the East-West conflict, a contest of broader ideological and geopolitical
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concerns. This means that the human rights contest between the Soviet authorities
and their adversaries was shaped by the Cold War context it operated in. It also
means that the convergence of human rights values spelled the end of one
important aspect of the Cold War, helping to bring about conditions needed to end
other aspects. Perhaps crucially for the ideologues, Helsinki norms could be
presented as universal and humanitarian instead of Western and capitalist.
After 1989 the USSR would face the challenges of upholding human
rights as the nation disintegrated and top leaders conspired to uphold their own
interest, while the satellite republics would face the challenges of emerging as
truly independent and democratic states in a chaotic international environment.
Tensions remained between the Soviet Union and the West, but improvement in
human rights had become largely a cooperative endeavor between domestic and
foreign rivals. A study of developing human rights norms in the satellite states
might look similar as they tended to take the Moscow line on human rights until
Gorbachev changed too much, and human rights advocates were suppressed until
the great transitions of 1989.
But the Soviets made undeniable progress. By 1989 the Soviet Union was
at the center of major changes in internal and international human rights policy.
Soviet leaders released political prisoners and legalized public gatherings and
organizations not sanctioned by the Party. The conclusion of the Vienna
Conference and Gorbachev’s embracing of Helsinki principles at Strasbourg
meant the integration of the USSR into a new pan-European human rights regime.
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When dissidents became prominent actors in Soviet government and civil society
a major shift had been marked.
Perhaps the Helsinki network deserves a place as one of the periodic,
quickly crushed rebellions against Soviet power. If so, it was similar to the
rebellions of the Prague Spring and Solidarity in that its partisans would
ultimately come back to haunt the regime. The CSCE certainly deserves credit as
a primary motor of the human rights component to the East-West confrontation
and reconciliation. It was also an influence in pushing the Soviet Union towards
political reform, and deserves a place among other factors in Soviet reform such
as economic trouble, generational change within the intelligentsia, and the
Chernobyl disaster. In order to step out from behind the Iron Curtain the Soviet
Union had to adopt the human rights standards that the West fought to include in
the Helsinki Final Act.
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